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INTRODUCTION

racticing securities law is becoming a risky, and for many lawyers,
even a dangerous, profession.1 Securities lawyers usually represent
honest clients and are well paid for their work. However, the occasional dishonest client can wreak havoc on a lawyer's career, particularly
when it is not clear what the lawyer must do to detect and disclose fraud.
This uncertainty is all the more frightening given the willingness of private plaintiffs and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to
take action against a lawyer when a client's fraud is discovered.
One of the most intimidating threats is the specter of civil liability.
Although not nearly as ominous for lawyers as for accountants, 2 civil lia1. "Lawyers practicing in high-risk fields such as banking, securities, and other heavily regulated areas are finding malpractice insurance unavailable or increasingly expensive." Jennifer J. Johnson, Limited Liability for Lawyers: General Partners Need Not
Apply, 51 Bus. LAW. 85, 88 (Nov. 1995).
2. See text accompanying notes 56-59 & 75-85 infra; see generally JAY M. FEINMAN,
ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE: LIABILITY OF PROFESSIONALS AND BUSINESSES TO THIRD PARTIES FOR ECONOMIC LOSS (1995) (analysis of civil liability for professionals).
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bility under the securities laws remains a serious threat to lawyers. Even
a lawsuit that never results in a judgment can have a potentially ruinous
effect on a lawyer's reputation and career. This threat is compounded by
the fact that a lawyer is uncertain of exactly what a judge or jury, with the
luxury of hindsight, will decide should have been done about client fraud.
Case law is surprisingly vague about what lawyers must do to detect and
disclose fraud, 3 even though a clearer articulation of lawyers' responsibilities would go a long way toward preventing professional lapses that give
rise to litigation in the first place.
A second threat facing securities lawyers is the SEC's various mechanisms for sanctioning lawyers. First, Rule 2(e) disciplinary proceedings
allow the SEC to suspend or disbar a lawyer from practice before the
SEC for, among other things, conduct that shows the lawyer to be "lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper
professional conduct."'4 Second, the SEC can enter cease and desist orders under the 1990 Remedies Act. 5 Although such orders can only be
issued against persons found to have committed or to have been the
"cause" of a violation of the securities laws, the statutory language would
potentially be open ended if the SEC and the courts began to embrace an
expanded view of what type of conduct "causes" a violation to occur.
Finally, the SEC has long believed itself to have, and has exercised, the
power to prosecute aiders and abetters of securities laws violations, a
power recently affirmed in the newly enacted Private Securities Litigation
6
Reform Act of 1995 (the "1995 Reform Act").
These SEC disciplinary and enforcement proceedings can be unpredictable and protracted, 7 and are particularly threatening to lawyers because
they almost always arise out of situations where a client's conduct, not the
lawyer's, initiated the underlying violation. This additional layer of potential sanctions against lawyers beyond state bar disciplinary proceedings is also administered by an agency whose primary objective is
protection of investors, not professional ethics. Indeed, the effect of enforcement proceedings against lawyers may be secondary in the minds of
agency officials bent on doing anything necessary to combat fraud.
Although the SEC's expertise in securities law makes it an appropriate
3. See text accompanying notes 106-12 infra; Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to
Frame the Law and Others Frame It to Their Will, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1993)
(courts fail to effectively resolve differences between regulators and bar associations about
disclosure of client misconduct).
4. SEC Procedural Rules § 2(e)(1)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1)(ii)(1996).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (1996) [hereinafter the Remedies Act]; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1996).
The Securities Act of 1933, May 27, 1933, ch. 38, title 1, 48 Stat. 74, is codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77 [hereinafter the 1933 Act]. The Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, June 6, 1934, ch.
404, 48 Stat. 881, is codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 [hereinafter the 1934
Act].
6. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 109
Stat. 737 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78) [hereinafter 1995 Reform
Act] (amending § 20 of the 1934 Act).
7. For example, the SEC's proceeding against George Kern, see text accompanying
notes 127-33 infra, lasted for over two years.
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figure to establish and enforce professional conduct norms, the wielding
of such power should be coupled with a clear articulation of the expected
standards for lawyer conduct. Because the SEC and the courts have been
ambiguous on what a lawyer is required to disclose about a client's conduct and to whom, this Article suggests that recent changes in the securities laws should have included a clear set of rules delineating exactly what
lawyers should do about client fraud.
By examining the 1995 Reform Act, Title III, Section 301, which requires accountants to follow specified procedures when confronted with
corporate fraud, 8 this Article discusses whether the 1995 Reform Act
should have imposed similar disclosure obligations on lawyers. This Article concludes that the 1995 Reform Act should have clearly articulated ex
ante what lawyers' responsibilities are, rather than leave those responsibilities up to determination by courts and the Commission ex post. Finally, this Article proposes statutory language which would establish
some immutable rules of professional conduct and some default rules.
The default rules would apply unless a registrant clearly instructs its attorneys differently in language appearing in its articles of incorporation.
Part II of this Article describes some of the most important private
rights of action that have been used against accountants and lawyers, as
well as the SEC's enforcement arsenal against professionals. Parts III
and IV examine inconsistencies in the standards that have been applied
to accountants and lawyers respectively and the need for clarification of
those standards. Part V describes how unclear standards have caused unpredictable accountant and lawyer discipline at the hands of the SEC.
Part VI looks at how the 1995 Reform Act, with the approval of the accounting profession, clarified what exactly an auditor must do in the face
of client fraud, and explains how the difference between functions performed by accountants and lawyers is reflected in the inclusion of accountants, but not lawyers, in the 1995 Reform Act's procedures for
detection and disclosure of corporate fraud.
Part VII presents a proposal to clarify the obligations of lawyers who
confront client fraud. Although the responsibilities of lawyers should
have been addressed in the 1995 Reform Act, lawyer disclosure of client
fraud should be approached differently than the manner in which the
1995 Reform Act approaches accountant disclosure of client fraud.
Whereas immutable disclosure rules are imposed on accountants in the
1995 Reform Act, this Article suggests that lawyers should be governed
by some immutable rules, such as those requiring lawyers to resign if a
client refuses to rectify a material illegal act, and some default rules that
clients could change by amending their articles of incorporation to give
more protection to client confidences. 9 Lawyers who comply with the
rules should come within a statutory safe harbor immunizing them from
civil suits and SEC disciplinary actions grounded in a theory that they
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (1996).
9. See text accompanying notes 216-48 infra.
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failed to perform a duty to disclose. Part VIII briefly summarizes some
of the advantages and disadvantages of our proposal.
II. PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAWS
A.

CIVIL LIABILITY

The civil liability of accountants, lawyers, and other professionals is becoming an increasingly ominous specter in securities law. Professionals
and their insurers are often believed to be "deep pockets" in situations
where the issuer of securities, its promoters, and its principals are long
gone, whether having flown the jurisdiction literally or figuratively by
way of insolvency. The number of settlements of cases involving professionals grew at an annual rate of about 18.4% from 1989 to 1994.10 Indeed, a 1993 study of securities class actions found that including lawyers,
accountants, or underwriters as codefendants added over 50% to a case's
expected settlement value. 1 Although this Article will not explore all
the possible variants of professional liability under the securities laws,
two of the most important causes of action, those under Section 11 of the
1933 Securities Act (the "1933 Act") and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (the "1934 Act") are worth mentioning.
Section 11 of the 1933 Act imposes liability on certain persons for a
material misrepresentation or omission in a registration statement. 12 A
purchaser of registered shares can sue under this section if, when a registration statement has become effective, the registration statement "contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted a material fact"
necessary to make the statements made not misleading.' 3 The purchaser
can sue the issuer, all persons who sign the registration statement, directors and partners of the issuer, and persons about to become directors or
14
partners of the issuer.
Section 11 also allows a purchaser to sue certain experts, including accountants who certify financial statements.' 5 This includes:
[E]very accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his
consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the
registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any report
or valuation which is used in connection with the registration state10. Steven P. Marino & Rende D. Marino, An Empirical Study of Recent Securities
Class Action Settlements Involving Accountants, Attorneys, or Underwriters,22 SEC. REG.
L. J. 115, 131 (1994).
11. Id. at 117.
12. 1933 Act, supra note 5, § 11(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77k).
13. 1933 Act, supra note 5, § 11 (1).
14. 1933 Act, supra note 5, § 11(l)-(5).
15. 1933 Act, supra note 5, § 11(1)-(5). Financial statements include three principal
statements of a company's financial condition: (1) the balance sheet; (2) income statement;
and (3) statement of change in working capital. See Edward J. Yodowitz et al., An Overview of FinancialStatement Litigation,in EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 1985, at 115, 121 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 492, 1985).
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ment, with respect to the statement in such registration statement,
report, or valuation,
which purports to have been prepared or certi16
fied by him.
Noticeably absent from the enumerated list of professional defendants in
Section 11 are the class of professionals who had a prominent role in
drafting the 1933 Act but who, apart from narrowly crafted opinion letters, carefully avoid being named as experts in connection with a registration statement-lawyers.
Professionals may also be liable for securities fraud under Section 10-b
of the 1934 Act and Rule 10-b-5 thereunder. 17 Unlike Section 11, which
predicates liability on a professional defendant allowing herself to be
named in a registration statement, Section 10-b potentially reaches professionals, including lawyers, in a broad range of circumstances where
they participate in a client's fraud. Two questions that have arisen under
Section 10-b are: (1) whether a defendant can be liable for merely negligent, but not knowing or reckless, conduct, and (2) whether a defendant
can be liable for aiding and abetting a fraud perpetrated by another person. The Supreme Court has answered both questions in the negative.
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, respondents, customers of a brokerage
firm audited by the Ernst & Ernst accounting firm, invested in a fraudulent securities scheme. 18 When the fraud came to light, the respondents
sued under Section 10-b. The Supreme Court held that a Section 10-b
action required an allegation of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 19 The Court relied on the "operative language of the statute" as
well as the legislative history:
It is difficult to believe that any lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator would use these words if the intent was to create liability for
merely negligent acts or omissions. Neither the legislative history
nor the briefs supporting respondents identify any usage or authority
for construing
'manipulative (or cunning) devices' to include
20
negligence.
The Court thus dismissed the respondents' claim which had been brought
under a negligence theory, but left for another day the decision of
21
whether recklessness would meet the scienter requirement.
In 1994, the Supreme Court addressed aiding and abetting liability
under Section 10-b in CentralBank v. FirstInterstate Bank.2 2 Prior decisions had left open the question of whether private civil liability under
16. 1933 Act, supra note 5, § 11(4).
17. See Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 297 (5th Cir. 1990) (triable
issue of fact raised as to whether accounting firm had knowledge or was severely reckless
in issuing false and misleading audit report); Akin v. Q-L Inv., Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 526 (5th
Cir. 1992) (triable issue of fact raised as to whether accountants intentionally or recklessly
deceived investors when they failed to disclose certain items in audit report).
18. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
19. Id. at 193.
20. Id. at 199, 203.
21. Id at 194, n.12.
22. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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Section 10-b could be extended to persons who, while not primary violators, aided and abetted another person's violation of Section 10-b. 23 The
Court again applied a narrow reading of the statute and held that its prohibition of "manipulative and deceptive" conduct "does not include giving aid to a person who commits a manipulative or deceptive act."'24 The

Court observed: "We cannot amend the statute to create liability for acts
that are not themselves manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of
the statute.

'2 5

Thus, after Central Bank, private plaintiffs will have to

demonstrate that accountants or lawyers themselves26committed fraud
when suing them under Section 10-b of the 1934 Act.
B.

THE

SEC

ENFORCEMENT ARSENAL AGAINST PROFESSIONALS

With the Supreme Court's limitation of Section 10-b civil liability to

knowing or reckless conduct that amounts to a primary violation, the
SEC's enforcement arsenal against professionals becomes all the more
important as a deterrent to professional malfeasance or omission. Indeed, the narrower scope of civil liability may encourage the SEC to fill
the perceived void with stepped up enforcement actions.
27
In addition to prosecuting primary violations of the securities laws,

the SEC may sanction professionals in a variety of ways, including Rule
2(e) disciplinary proceedings, cease and desist orders, or using its authority to prosecute aiders and abetters under the 1995 Reform Act. 28 Proceedings brought under each of these provisions are discussed more
completely in Part V below.
1.

Rule 2(e) Disciplinary Proceedings

SEC Rule 2(e) proceedings are more common than proceedings
against professionals by other administrative agencies, although infre23. "In view of our holding that an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud is required for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, we need not consider whether civil
liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the Rule, nor the
elements necessary to establish such a cause of action." Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 191-92
n.7. "While several courts of appeals have permitted aider-and-abetter liability, see lIT,
An International Investment Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (CA2 1980) (collecting
cases), we specifically reserved this issue in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder." Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983).
24. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177.
25. Id.
26. Other Supreme Court cases that have restricted private rights of action under the
1934 Act, § 10-b, include Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)
(plaintiff has no standing to sue unless an actual purchaser or seller of securities) and Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (no cause of action under § 10-b for breach of
fiduciary duty by corporate officials standing alone, absent deceptive practice on
investors).
27. See, e.g., 1933 Act, supra note 5, § 20 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17t); 1934 Act, supra
note 5, § 21 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u).
28. The discussion of SEC enforcement procedures herein, text accompanying notes
27-39 infra, is drawn in part from the discussion of SEC sanctions against attorneys in
Richard W. Painter, Game Theoretic and ContractarianParadigms in the Uneasy Relationship Between Regulatorsand Regulatory Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 149, 193-95 (1996).
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quent relative to the number of lawyers and accountants working on securities offerings. 29 Rule 2(e)(1) provides:

[T]he [SEC] may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of
appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is
found by the [SEC] after notice of an opportunity for hearing in the
matter (i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent
others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct, or (iii) to have
willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any
provision of3 0the Federal securities laws, or the rules and regulations
thereunder.
Although the SEC used Rule 2(e) to define professional standards for
attorneys through the early 1980s, it has since retreated from this position

and has only started Rule 2(e) disciplinary proceedings against attorneys
who have already been found by a court or the SEC to have violated the
securities laws. 3 1
2.

Cease and Desist Orders Under the Remedies Act

The SEC also may sanction attorneys and accountants pursuant to the
Remedies Act under which the Commission may:
[E]nter an order requiring [a person who has or is about to violate
the securities laws], and any other person that is, was or would be a
cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or
should have known would contribute to such violation, to cease and

desist from committing or causing such violation 32and any future violation of the same provision, rule, or regulation.
Although the Commission has occasionally used the Remedies Act

against professionals, 33 the statutory language states that there must be,
or about to be, a violation of the securities laws before the Commission
29. There had been a total of roughly 139 reported Rule 2(e) cases as of 1991. These
cases involved 147 individual lawyers and four law firms. Robert W. Emerson, Rule 2(e)
Revisited: SEC Disciplining of Attorneys Since In re Carter, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 155, 175
(1991). During the "peak years" 1975-1977, 53 individual attorneys (36% of the total) and
three law firms (75% of the total) were subject to such proceedings. Id. at 176. By contrast, only 26 lawyers went through Rule 2(e) proceedings during the 1980s. Id. at 176-77,
211-12.
30. SEC Procedural Rules § 2(e)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1)(1996).
31. See text accompanying notes 125-26 infra. See also James R. Doty, Regulatory
Expectations Regardingthe Conduct of Attorneys in the Enforcement of the FederalSecurities Laws: Recent Development and Lessons for the Future, 48 Bus. LAW. 1543, 1544-48
(1993); Daniel L. Goelzer & Susan F. Wyderko, Rule 2(e): Securities and Exchange Commission Disciplineof Professionals,85 Nw. U. L. REV. 652 (1991); Harvey L. Pitt & Karen
L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J.
ON REG.

149, 176-77 (1990).

32. 1933 Act, supra note 5, § 8A (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1); 1934 Act, supra note
5, § 21C (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3).
33. See In re Feldman, Securities Act Release No. 33-7014, 55 SEC Docket (CCH) 9,
12 (Sept. 20, 1993) (lawyer for three Pakistani banks "aided and abetted and caused" violations of § 5(a) and (c) of the 1933 Act by incorrectly advising his client that the offering of
rupee-denominated foreign exchange bearer certificates did not involve securities required
to be registered prior to sale in U.S.).
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may enter an order to cease and desist. 34

Accordingly, this limits the

Commission's options since professional misconduct can only be sanctioned after a finding that a violation has occurred or is about to occur

and the lawyer or accountant is found to be the violator or the "cause" of
the violation. Nonetheless, the statutory language potentially authorizes
the sanctioning of professionals for a wide range of conduct, depending
SEC and the courts view as conduct that "causes" a violation
on what the
to occur.35
3. Prosecution of Aiders and Abetters
The 1995 Reform Act, Section 104, amends Section 20 of the 1934 Act

to expressly grant the Commission authority to prosecute persons who
aid and abet violations of the securities laws:

[F]or purposes of any action brought by the Commission under paragraph (1) or (3) of Section 21(d), any person that knowingly provides
substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of
this title, or of any rule or regulation issued under this title, shall be
deemed to be in violation of such provision to36the same extent as the
person to whom such assistance is provided.
Although the Supreme Court ruled in Central Bank that private litigants
may not assert aiding and abetting claims under the 1934 Act, 37 the SEC
has long believed itself to have the authority to prosecute aiders and
abetters as well as primary violators. This provision of the 1995 Reform

Act reaffirms that view. Nonetheless, the most prominent SEC proceeding against lawyers as aiders and abetters, SEC v. National Student Marketing,38 was decided almost twenty years ago, and federal courts have
professionals for aiding and abetting
traditionally resisted claims against
39

violations of the securities laws.

34. 1933 Act, supra note 5, § 8A(a); 1934 Act, supra note 5, § 21C(a).
35. Although the SEC's 1987 proceedings against George Kern were brought prior to
the Remedies Act, and were ultimately dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, the underlying
premise of those proceedings was that Kern had "caused" his client to violate the Williams
Act. See text accompanying note 127 infra.
36. 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 104 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t).
37. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191 (no private cause of action for aiding and abetting
under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act).
38. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); see text
accompanying note 107-11 infra.
39. Much of the case law in this area was decided prior to Central Bank and assumed a
private right of action for aiding and abetting a violation of the 1934 Act. See Barker v.
Henderson, 797 F.2d 490,495 (7th Cir. 1986) (law firm not liable to purchasers of bonds for
fraud under § 10(b) because lawyer had no duty to disclose client issuer's fraud to bond
purchasers); see also Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 1990) (attorney
not liable under § 10(b) to investors in client's fraudulent cattle leasing program because
no duty to disclose); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1988)
(bond underwriter's counsel had no duty to plaintiff purchasers of bonds that could form
the basis for liability under § 10(b)). See Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer
Disclosureof Services: In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
221, 236-37 (1995).
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ACCOUNTANTS AND CORPORATE FRAUD
A.

ACCOUNTANT PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The SEC first suggested in 194040 that publicly traded entities use audit
committees, and then formally endorsed the practice in 1972.41 In 1987,
the National Commission on Fraudulent Reporting recommended that
"all public companies should be required by SEC rules to establish audit
committees composed solely of independent directors." 42 Accountants
supervised by independent directors thus have an increasingly important
role in monitoring registrants' adherence to the disclosure requirements
43
of the securities laws.
The accounting profession, like the legal profession, is governed by internal standards of professional conduct. 44 Rule 202 of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Code of Professional Conduct
("AICPA Code") requires an AICPA member to comply with auditing
and other standards "promulgated by bodies designated by [the AICPA
council]. '45 Rule 203 states that a member shall not express an opinion
or state affirmatively that financial statements are presented in conformity with GAAP or claim that she "is not aware of any material modifications that should be made," if such financial statements materially depart
from promulgated standards. 46 Meanwhile, Rule 301 prohibits a member
from "disclos[ing] any confidential client information without the specific
consent of the client."'47 However, Rule 301 is not intended to relieve a
member of professional obligations under rules 202 or 203, or to limit the
member's duty "to comply with a validly issued and enforceable subpoena or summons. '4 8 Nor should Rule 301 be interpreted to prevent an
40. In re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Accounting Series Release No. 19, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-2707, slip opinion (Dec. 5, 1940).
41. STANDING AUDIT COMMITTEES COMPOSED OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS, Accounting
Series Release No. 123 (Mar. 23, 1972); see G.H. Lander et al., Reduced Liability for the
Management Accountant, 68 U. DET. L. REv. 1, 7 (1990).
42. ERNST & WHINNEY, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT
FINANCIAL REPORTING 8 (Oct. 1987). The ITeadway Commission also recommended that

"the board of directors of every public company should develop and approve a written
charter delineating the audit committee's duties and responsibilities" and that "the SEC
should require that the annual report to stockholders include a letter from the audit committee chairman describing the committee's responsibilities and activities during the year."
Id. at 8-9. The responsibilities of auditors are now also broadly defined by statute. See
discussion of the 1995 Reform Act, in text accompanying notes 177-85 infra.

43. Audit committees should "review the independence of the independent public ac-

countant"; "monitor compliance with company codes of conduct as part of their ongoing

oversight of the effectiveness of internal controls"; "oversee the quarterly reporting process"; and "monitor instances where managements seek second opinions on significant accounting issues." ERNST & WHINNEY, supra note 42, at 8-9.
44. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (AICPA), CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1995) (for accountants) [hereinafter AICPA CODE]; MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1995) (for lawyers).

45. AICPA CODE, supra note 44, Rule 202.
46. AICPA CODE, supra note 44, Rule 203.
47. AICPA CODE, supra note 44, Rule 301.
48. AICPA CODE, supra note 44, Rule 301; see James R. Doty, ProfessionalLiability
Issues for Accountants and Lawyers, in REFORMING LEGAL ETHICS IN A REGULATED EN-
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AICPA member from exchanging information with a recognized "investigative or disciplinary body."'49 Although the AICPA Code does not ordinarily require the auditor to disclose its findings to persons other than the
client itself, such a duty might arise under some circumstances. 50 For example, disclosure to the SEC becomes mandatory "when the entity re-

ports changes in auditors to the SEC on the form 8-K.''51 Disclosure of
confidential client information is also mandatory in response to a succes52
sor auditor who makes an inquiry in accordance with applicable rules.

Furthermore, confidential information learned by an accountant from a
client does not fall within any recognized and protected evidentiary privilege. 5 3 In Couch v. United States, the Supreme Court noted "that no con-

fidential accountant-client privilege exists under federal law, and no
state-created privilege has been recognized in federal cases."'54 Again, in
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., the Court elaborated its rationale

for rejecting both an accountant-client work product doctrine as well as a
privilege for communications with accountants:
Nor do we find persuasive the argument that a work-product immunity for accountants' tax accrual workpapers is a fitting analogue
to the attorney work-product doctrine established in Hickman v.
Taylor. The Hickman work-product doctrine was founded upon the
private attorney's role as the client's confidential adviser and advocate, a loyal representative whose duty it is to present the client's
case in the most favorable possible light. An independent certified
public accountant performs a different role. By certifying the public
reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status, the

independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending
any employment relationship with the client. The independent pub-

lic accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to
the investing public. This "public watchdog" function demands that
the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all
VIRONMENT: THE REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE ON LAWYER AND ACCOUNTANT LIABILrrY AND RESPONSIBILITY 71 (American Law Institute, 1994). The Interpretation to Rule

301 states that:
The prohibition against disclosure of confidential information obtained in the
course of a professional engagement does not apply to disclosure of such
information when required to properly discharge the member's responsibility
according to the profession's standards. The prohibition would not apply, for
example, to disclosure, as required by Section 561 of the Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1 [AU section 561], of subsequent discovery of facts existing at the date of the auditor's report which would have affected the
auditor's report had he been aware of such facts.
AICPA CODE, supra note 44, Rule 301 (Interpretation).
49. AICPA CODE, supra note 44, Rule 301.
50. Doty, supra note 48, at 9.
51. Doty, supra note 48, at 9.
52. Doty, supra note 48, at 8-9.
53. Doty, supra note 48, at 8.
54. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (citing Falsone v. United States,
205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953); Gariepy v. United States, 189 F.2d
459, 463-64 (6th Cir. 1951); Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 806 (9th Cir. 1954)).
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times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust. To insulate
from disclosure a certified public accountant's interpretations of the
client's financial statements would be to ignore the significance of
the accountant's
role as a disinterested analyst charged with public
55
obligations.
This difference between functions performed by accountants and lawyers
is reflected not only in the Court's different treatment of confidential client communications, but, as discussed in Part VI infra, also in the inclusion of accountants, but not lawyers, in the 1995 Reform Act's procedures
for detection and disclosure of corporate fraud.
B.

CIVIL LIABILITY OF ACCOUNTANTS FOR CLIENT FRAUD

Accountants have been named as defendants in securities lawsuits
more often than lawyers and have settled these suits for much more
money than lawyers have. Indeed, between 1989 and 1994, the Big Six
accounting firms settled 35 securities class actions (70% of the total of 50
class actions against all accounting firms) for $395.82 million (82% of the
total of $482 million paid by all firms). 56 Over that period the Big Six
firms have each settled from 3 class actions (Price Waterhouse) up to 10
(KPMG Peat Marwick).5 7 All of the Big Six firms are defending one or
more lawsuits virtually all of the time 58 and "claim to be experiencing a
tidal wave of liability lawsuits that threaten their existence." 59 With class
actions so frequent and the stakes so large, the view of the courts, regardless of internal professional standards, is critical to these Big Six firms and
to accounting firms in general. What exactly do courts expect auditors to
do about client fraud? What and when are auditors required to disclose?
Unfortunately, case law on this subject has not been entirely consistent,
and has provided less guidance to accountants than it should, particularly
given the amount of potential damages involved in securities fraud
litigation.
Two appellate cases, Windon Third Oil & Gas DrillingPartnership v.
FDIC60 and Rudolph v. Arthur Anderson & Co.61, are representative of
courts' differing approaches to accountants' duty to disclose client fraud
under Section 10-b of the 1934 Act. In Windon, several limited partnerships were formed, including Windon Third Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership ("Windon"), in order to acquire "fractional interests in oil and gas
55. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984) (citations omitted).
56. Marino & Marino, supra note 10, at 148 (table 8).
57. Marino & Marino, supra note 10, at 148. Five of KPMG Peat Marwick's class
action suits were settled in one year, 1993. Marino & Marino, supra note 10, at 148.
58. Marino & Marino, supra note 10, at 148 (each one of the Big Six firms settled at
least one securities class action in 1992 and 1993).
59. Marino & Marino, supra note 10, at 149.
60. Windon Third Oil & Gas Drilling Partnership v. FDIC, 805 F.2d 342 (10th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
61. Rudolph v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 800 F.2d 1040 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 946 (1987).
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leases for wells in Oklahoma, Kansas, and Texas."'62 Windon "retained
Clifford Resources, Inc. (CRI), whose President, Hal Clifford had previously supervised the exploration, development, and operation of Windon
partnership wells."'63 The accounting firm of Peat, Marwick Mitchell &
Co. audited CRI's books and records, as well as those of Penn Square
64
Bank, which had loaned capital to each of the Windon limited partners.
Windon later sued the accounting firm for allegedly making misrepresentations and failing to disclose material facts about the financial stability of
CRI in a telephone conversation with Windon's general partner prior to
formation of the Windon partnership. 65 The Tenth Circuit held that the
accountants had no duty to disclose the information to Windon because
neither a trust nor a confidential relationship had been formed. The
court explained:
The failure to disclose material information is actionable only when
[one] is under a duty to do so. And the duty to disclose arises when
one party has information that the other party is entitled to know
because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them. A duty arises from the relationship between
the parties not merely because one party has an ability to acquire
information ....Without a duty to disclose, silence cannot be made
66
fraudulent.
The court thus limited an accountant's duty to disclose to those situations
where a certain trust relationship had been formed between the parties.
In Rudolph v. Arthur Anderson & Co., the Eleventh Circuit espoused a
much more expansive view of the duties of accountants to disclose. 67 The
Rudolph case stemmed from the failed limited partnership formed by
68
auto magnate John DeLorean for the purpose of producing sports cars.
The investors sued Arthur Anderson & Co., the partnership's auditor,
claiming both that DeLorean "had intentionally defrauded the investors
and that Anderson [was] liable for the loss because it either knew or
should have known of the fraud."'69 The court acknowledged that an
omission is proscribed only when a duty to disclose has arisen. 70 The
court then used several factors to determine whether the defendant in
Rudolph had a duty to disclose the fraud. The court explained that
whether a duty to disclose arose depended on the circumstances of the
case, and that factors to consider in such an evaluation were: "the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, the parties' relative access
to the information to be disclosed, the benefit derived by the defendant
62. Windon, 805 F.2d at 343.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 343-44.
65. Id. at 344, 346.
66. Id at 347 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)) (citations
omitted).
67. Rudolph, 800 F.2d at 1040.
68. Id. at 1041.
69. Id.

70. Id. at 1043.
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from the purchase or sale, defendant's awareness of plaintiff's reliance on
defendant in making its investment decision, and defendant's role in initiating the purchase or sale."'7 1 While the court found the above stated
factors important in making a determination of whether a duty to disclose
had arisen, the court did not find these factors to be exclusive. A duty to
disclose may also arise from the defendant's previous voluntary disclosure, if non-disclosure would result in making the defendant's own statement misleading or deceptive, if the defendant had knowledge of the
72
fraud, or if the misstatement or omission is particularly significant.
Whereas the Tenth Circuit in Windon looked specifically for "a fiduciary
or other similar relation of trust and confidence" 73 between the plaintiff
and the defendant accountant, the Eleventh Circuit was prepared to decide the "duty to disclose" 74 issue on a broad range of particularized facts
ineach case.
IV.

LAWYERS AND CORPORATE FRAUD

Attorneys have not been harmed as much as accountants by joint and
several liability in securities class actions. 75 A statistical study of class
action settlements shows that between 1989 and 1993 attorneys were
named as parties in 61 class actions that were all or partially settled, and
that 34 of these settlements were disclosed, totalling $134.91 million. 76 A
few very large attorney settlements affected this total (for example $48
million in connection with the American Continental/Lincoln Savings and
Loan litigation), 77 and the vast majority of attorney settlements were
much smaller than the settlements for accountants (2 attorney settlements were for $10 million or more, 16 for from $1 million to under $10
million, and 16 for less than $1 million). 78 Fifty-nine law firms were sued
in class actions, but, in sharp contrast to the accounting profession where
the largest firms appear to be at the heart of the liability wave, only 9 of
these law firms were among the largest 100 firms in the country. 79 The
overwhelming majority (69%) of attorney settlements involved two types
of transactions, bond offerings and investments in limited partnerships. 80
71. Id. (quoting First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977),

cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978)).
72. Id. Such a context-specific approach is in keeping with that urged by Professor
Feinman in his 1995 treatise on the liability of professionals and businesses. Feinman "advocates attention to the nature of the relationships involved in a particular case and to the
details of context as the best way to choose which doctrine to use and how to apply it."

Jean Braucher, Economic Negligence: Liability of Professionals and Businesses to Third
Partiesfor Economic Loss, 51 Bus. LAW. 795, 797 (1996) (book review) (citing FEINMAN,

supra note 2, §§ 1.4, 7.4.1).
73. Windon, 805 F.2d at 347.

74. Rudolph, 800 F.2d at 1043.

75. Marino & Marino, supra note 10, at 159; see also text accompanying notes 56-59
supra.

76. Marino & Marino, supra note 10, at 162 (table 13).
77. Marino & Marino, supra note 10, at 163.

78. Marino & Marino, supra note 10, at 162.

79. Marino & Marino, supra note 10, at 162.
80. Marino & Marino, supra note 10, at 160.
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Perhaps most important, only 2 law firms were named as defendants
twice in class actions; all others were named only once. 8 1 For attorneys,
being named a defendant in a securities class action is not a repeat period
game 82 as it is for Big Six accounting firms; the specter of civil liability is
real, but nowhere near the magnitude of that confronting accountants.
However, lawyers find civil suits, as well as the SEC disciplinary proceedings discussed in Part V below, to be difficult and costly, primarily
because attorneys' lower exposure to monetary damages is counterbal83
anced by their very high exposure to loss of reputational capital.
Reputational capital is important to accountants as well as to lawyers, but
there is a difference. The accounting profession is dominated by the Big
Six accounting firms, all of which have been sued for substantial sums in
connection with securities fraud claims, making differentiation by reputation difficult. The difference between Coopers and Lybrand, which disclosed $145 million in settlements in 1992, and KPMG Peat Marwick,
which disclosed $4.5 million in the same year, is discernable but also debatable, particularly in view of the fact that, in the following year (1993)
Coopers and Lybrand disclosed $25.90 million in settlements whereas
KPMG Peat Marwick disclosed $55.32 million. 84 By contrast, there are
hundreds of law firms practicing in the securities area. Only a small,
although growing, portion of these firms have been named as defendants
in high profile securities fraud litigation. Whereas for a large accounting
firm a securities suit is simply one more suit to be settled or litigated, for
most law firms any lawsuit is a crisis calling into question the integrity of
the firm's lawyers. The reputational paradigm in the legal profession is
thus particularly sensitive to an allegation of improper professional conduct, and a lawyer who has been sued or named as a respondent in a SEC
disciplinary proceeding has a lot more to worry about than monetary loss.
A securities practice that took years to build can dissolve almost overnight as clients, with plenty of lawyers and law firms to choose from, depart for one of many competitors who have managed to avoid disciplinary
actions or civil suits, regardless of how those proceedings are ultimately
resolved. For accountants, although reputation is important, it may be
the money paid out in judgments and settlements that matters the most;
for lawyers, the effect of a proceeding on reputation is perhaps most
81. Marino & Marino, supra note 10, at 163.
82. Although this Article will not apply the insights of game theory to class action
settlement negotiations, it is worth noting that repeat period games are played differently
than games in which one or more of the players are not likely to play for a second time.
This is also true of "games" between lawyers and regulators. See Painter, supra note 28, at
157-58; Ian Ayres, Response to Painter,65 FORDHAM L. REV. 201 (1996).
83. For a discussion of the importance of reputational capital to securities lawyers, see

Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15 (1995). As
Okamoto observes, "[tihe reputational capital paradigm is an economic model that was
first developed in an article by Professors Klein and Leffler." Id. at 22 n.18 (citing Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring ContractualPerformance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981)).
84. See Marino & Marino, supra note 10, at 148 (table 8).
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critical. 85
Attorneys, perhaps even more than accountants, would thus benefit
from clear and predictable rules that help them avoid even being named
as defendants in a lawsuit or as respondents in disciplinary proceedings.
Entrepreneurial and other high-risk issuers could also benefit if a clearer
definition of lawyers' responsibilities encouraged securities lawyers to
take more risks and seek a wider range of clients, instead of concentrating
their practice on established issuers, as many now do.86 The problem is

that there is significant disparity between the views of the bar, the courts,
and the SEC over what the rules are. The cost of this confusion and lack
of clarity is substantial, and perhaps exceeds the costs that would be imposed on the legal profession by any one rule, whatever that rule might
be.
The bar has traditionally endorsed rules that restrict disclosure of client
confidences. 87 For example, Model Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (the "Model Rules") allows disclosure of client
confidences, but only if the client intends to commit a crime that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm. 88 Yet, even under these limited circumstances, disclosure is
not required, 89 and if the client intends to commit fraud or crimes causing
only financial injury (unless that injury is to the lawyer), 90 disclosure is
not permitted. 91 In some situations, a lawyer may be required to withdraw from representing a client because Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits a
85. Reputation for integrity and good judgment is essential to much of the work that
lawyers do. "From a profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted
those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the
strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been
compendiously described as 'moral character."' Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
86. Karl Okamoto's statistical study of registration statements on Form S-1 (often filed
by new issuers) and on Form S-3 (available only to established issuers) shows that prestigious firms with high reputational capital to protect are choosier about stock offerings than
they are about less risky debt offerings, have a larger share of the market in less risky S-3
offerings than they do in the more risky S-1 offerings, and shun IPOs by unestablished
companies. Okamoto, supra note 83, at 35-37. "Clearly the top-fifty firms were... leaving
the smaller companies to the lower prestige law firms." Okamoto, supra note 83, at 37.
"The principal finding from the data is the existence of segmentation in the market for
legal services based on the value of reputation.... [H]igh-reputation law firms shun highrisk work." Okamoto, supra note 83, at 38.
87. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6 (1995).
88. Id. "[A] lawyer may reveal [confidential client] information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm."
Id. Rule 1.6(b)(1) (emphasis added).
89. Id. Model Rule 1.6(b) defines an attorney's obligations in terms of "may," not
"shall." Id.
90. Model Rule 1.6 permits a lawyer to disclose client confidences in order to establish
her own claim or defense once the lawyer has been sued, criminally charged, or charged in
a disciplinary proceeding in connection with conduct in which the client was involved. Id.
Rule 1.6(b)(2).
91. Id. Rule 1.6(a). Financial injury to the lawyer is the one exception. Model Rule
1.6 allows the disclosure necessary to collect unpaid fees. See id. Rule 1.6 cmt. 19.
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lawyer from assisting in criminal or fraudulent conduct, 92 and a lawyer
may, but is not required to, make a "noisy withdrawal" 93 in which she
renounces her prior opinions or work product. It is also worth noting
that most states have not adopted
these very narrow exceptions to confi94
dentiality in Model Rule 1.6.
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code") is somewhat
less restrictive than the Model Rules in allowing disclosure when a client
intends to commit a crime. 95 The Code, like Rule 1.6, is permissive; the
lawyer does not have to disclose. Also, the Code, like Rule 1.6, does not
allow disclosure in order to rectify a past crime. For example, a lawyer,
under the Code, may not alert investors to her client's prior fraudulent

sale of stock unless the client is continuing to violate the law. 96 Although

Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7) prohibits a lawyer from counseling or assisting a client in illegal or fraudulent conduct, 97 the Code does not require a lawyer who has discovered that her services have been used for
98

such ends to reveal the crime or fraud.

92. "A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the

lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent .. "

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 1.2(d) (1995). Model Rule 1.2(d), however, might be ignored where private litigants'
remedies for lawyer assisted fraud are sharply limited. See Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (no private right of action for aiding and abetting a violation of
§ 10-b prohibition on fraud in connection with purchase or sale of a security).
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 16 (1995).
94. Many state supreme courts have rewritten Rule 1.6 to allow or even require disclosure in a broader range of circumstances. See Koniak, supra note 3, at 1100. For a discussion of Model Rule 1.6 see Painter, supra note 39, at 231-32.
95. "A lawyer may reveal ... the intention of his client to commit a crime and the

information necessary to prevent the crime."

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101(C)(3) (1995) (emphasis added). Ironically, the Model Code of Profes-

sional Responsibility requires a lawyer to disclose when the misconduct is that of another
lawyer instead of her own client. See id. DR 1-103(A) (requiring lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of disciplinary rules violation to report such knowledge to tribunal or
authority empowered to investigate); In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (I11.
1989) (suspending
lawyer from practice for one year for violating DR 1-103(A)).
96. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1995).
97. "In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not... Counsel or assist his client
in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent." Id. DR 7-102(A)(7).
98. See generally Painter, supra note 39, at 231-32. The American Law Institute
("ALl") addresses disclosure of client confidences in its drafts of the Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117A
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) [hereinafter ALI Restatement]. Section 117A(1)(a) of

the draft Restatement permits disclosure to prevent death or serious bodily injury. However, the extent of disagreement within the ALI, as within other bar associations, on law-

yer "whistleblowing" is best revealed by the two versions of § 117A(1)(b) that permit
disclosure if a client has committed or intends to commit a crime or fraud that threatens to
cause substantial financial loss. The Reporters' proposed version permits disclosure neces-

sary to prevent the loss following a good faith attempt to dissuade the client from committing the crime or fraud. The alternative version, preferred by the ALl Director upon
consultation with a four-person ad hoc subcommittee of the ALl Council, only permits
disclosure of a crime or fraud "in the commission of which the lawyer's services were or are
being employed." Id. § 117A(1)(b). As the Reporters point out, the section "does not
apply to a past act of a client, no matter how clearly illegal and serious, if all of the harmful
consequences of the act have already occurred." Id. cmt. a. Nowhere does § 117A require
disclosure by the lawyer to prevent death, serious bodily injury, or financial loss. Id.
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These disclosure rules for lawyers are significantly different than the
rules that permit and sometimes require disclosure of client confidences
by accountants. Furthermore, confidential communications by clients to
lawyers, unlike those to accountants, are subject to an evidentiary privilege and to protection under the work product doctrine. 99
The securities laws also contemplate a somewhat different role for lawyers than for accountants. As pointed out above, lawyers are not among
the professionals enumerated in Section 11 as being potentially liable for
certifying a materially misleading portion of a registration statement. 100
Although Section 11 would still allow a lawyer to be sued in connection

with a portion of a registration statement that with his consent named
him as having prepared or certified that portion, rarely will a lawyer
agree to do so. Model Rule 2.3 allows a lawyer to "undertake an evalua-

tion of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the
client."'' 1 Such an evaluation could presumably include certification of a
portion of a registration statement. However, legal opinions included or
referenced in a registration statement are usually targeted at such issues

as due incorporation, corporate authority, and tax treatment of an investment. 10 2 Opinions giving "negative assurances" concerning a client's dis99. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (developing modern work product
doctrine). Hickman created two categories of work product: (1) factual material (such as
notes on an interview with a witness), which is protected from discovery unless the demanding party shows that production of these facts is essential to preparation of his case;
and (2) the attorney's mental impressions (such as often found in private notes or in a legal
memorandum), which are covered by an absolute privilege that continues regardless of the
other party's need for the information. Id. at 511-12. Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, material prepared in anticipation of litigation is discoverable only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has a "substantial need for the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
100. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. "[Clertain individuals who play a part
in preparing the registration statement generally cannot be reached by a §11 action. These
include ... lawyers not acting as experts." Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 387 n.22 (1983); see also Kitchens v. United States Shelter, [1988-89 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 93,920 (D.S.C. 1988).
101. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.3 (1995). The comments to
Rule 2.3 point out that the evaluation, while performed at the client's direction, may be for
the "primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties." Id. Rule
2.3 cmt. 1. The comments point out that, in such circumstances, "a legal duty to that [third]
person may or may not arise." Id. cmt. 4.
102. Even apart from § 11 liability, when third parties rely on lawyers' representations,
courts may hold the lawyers liable if the representations turn out to be inaccurate. See
generally Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987)(borrower's lawyer who certified to lender that borrower's farm machinery was free of encumbrances when in fact it
was not, liable to borrower for negligent misrepresentation), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043
(1988); Capital Bank & Trust v. Core, 343 So. 2d 284 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (lawyer for
corporate borrower could be liable for fraud on lender when opinion letter addressed to
lender stated that lawyer had examined certain records of his client when he had not);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, 605 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y. 1992) (borrower's lawyer owes lender
duty of care with respect to opinion addressed to lender). See Morgan Shipman, The Liabilities of Lawyers in Corporateand Securities Work, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 513, 523-25 (1993)
(discussing lawyer's duties to opinion letter addressees who are not clients); JONATHAN R.
MACEY, THIRD PARTY LEGAL OPINIONS

(1993); ABA Committee on Legal Opinions,

Third Party Legal Opinion Report, Including the Legal Opinion Accord of the Section of
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closure of material facts are used in securities offerings, but are narrowly
crafted to refer to specific disclosure documents and do not cover future
3
10
illegal acts.

For these reasons, most actions brought against lawyers under the securities laws allege that the lawyers went beyond mere failure to disclose
illegal acts. In rare circumstances, a lawyer who departs from her usual
professional functions to actively engage in solicitation of prospective
buyers for securities can become a "seller" of the securities, and therefore
liable in a suit for misrepresentation under Section 12(2) of the 1933
Act. 104 Occasionally, a lawyer may be deemed the equivalent of a
"seller" under state law even if she only performs her normal professional

functions in the offering. 0 5
An attorney who knowingly allows a client to use his assistance to con-

summate a fraudulent sale of securities can furthermore be sued either as
a primary violator or, in a SEC enforcement action, as an aider and abetter under Section 10-b of the 1934 Act. 10 6 In SEC v. National Student
Marketing Corp.,107 attorneys representing National Student Marketing
("National") discovered that National's earnings had been overstated in
financial statements, yet allowed a merger of National into another company to go forward without resoliciting approval from both companies'
shareholders.' 0 8 The court held that the attorneys aided and abetted
their client in violation of Section 10-b of the 1934 Act because the attor-

neys neglected their duty to protest National's decision to go ahead with
Business Law, American Bar Association, 47 Bus. LAW. 167 (1991) [hereinafter ABA
Opinion Accord].
103. In securities offerings, issuers often hire outside law firms to give opinions to underwriters and other persons who might be liable for misstatements or omissions in offering materials under § 11 of the 1933 Act. These opinions recite "negative assurances" that
material misstatements or omissions have not come to the attention of the opinion giver.
T pical language reads "based upon [our participation in drafting the Transaction Documents, involvement in transaction negotiations, etc.] nothing has come to our attention
that causes us to believe .... [that there] is any misstatement or omission of material facts
(excluding financial and accounting data)." Id. at 228.
104. See Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1126 (2d Cir.
1989) (lawyers for issuer of securities are not "sellers" under § 12(2) if they perform "only
their usual professional functions in preparing documents for an offering"). Since the
Supreme Court's holding in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995), § 12(2) liability only attaches to the sale of securities pursuant to a public offering.
105. See Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370 (Or. 1988) (lawyer for issuer of unregistered
securities liable under state law because lawyer substantially assisted in sale by drafting tax
opinion and other documentation for transaction).
106. See SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968) (reversing for procedural defects injunction against future violations by attorney of § 10(b) after misrepresentations
discovered in offering circular drafted in part by attorney); see also In re American Continental Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1452 (D. Ariz. 1992).
An attorney may not continue to provide services to corporate clients when
the attorney knows the client is engaged in a course of conduct designed to
deceive others, and where it is obvious that the attorney's compliant legal
service may be a substantial factor in permitting the deceit to continue.
Id.
107. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
108. Id. at 694.
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the merger. 10 9 "Their silence was not only a breach of this duty to speak,
but in addition lent the appearance of legitimacy to the closing." 110 In a
pattern that recurs throughout the cases and SEC disciplinary proceedings discussed in this Article, however, the court was less clear on exactly
what the lawyers should have done. "[I]t is unnecessary to determine the
precise extent of their obligations here, since... they took no steps whatsoever to delay the closing... ."1' As Susan Koniak correctly points out
in her insightful discussion of case law in this area, the National Student
Marketing court and others like it have been ineffective in resolving differences between competing visions of lawyers' responsibilities when confronted with client fraud." 2 This confusion over standards of
professional conduct is substantial enough that the SEC or Congress
should step in and say something about what lawyers are and are not
required to do.
V.

THE SHIFTING SANDS OF SEC DISCIPLINE FOR
LAWYERS AND ACCOUNTANTS

Although private claims against lawyers in connection with securities
offerings are more difficult after the Supreme Court's curtailment of private actions for aiding and abetting in Central Bank,113 the SEC may respond with stepped up enforcement efforts of its own. As discussed
further in this section, the SEC has already sometimes taken a position at
odds with the organized bar and demanded that lawyers do more to prevent and disclose client fraud. Administrative proceedings in the last fifteen years demonstrate the SEC's willingness to discipline professionals
who do not live up to its expectations. However, a closer look at these
proceedings reveals that the SEC's standards for professional discipline
of accountants and lawyers are no clearer than the standards courts use
for imposing civil liability.

A.

IN RE CARTER & JOHNSON

In re Carter& Johnson is a good example of a case where the SEC was
perceived by lawyers to have overreached and then pulled back in its
final disposition of the case. 1 4 Carter and Johnson represented National
Telephone for over a year and a half during which National Telephone
ignored legal advice from both Carter and Johnson and repeatedly failed
to make required disclosures in a 1933 Act registration statement, 1934
109. Id. at 715.
110. Id. at 713.
111. Id.
112. See Koniak, supra note 3, at 1081.
113. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
114. The reaction of the securities bar to the Carter& Johnson proceedings is discussed
in Werner Kronstein, SEC Practice: The Carter-Johnson Case: A Higher Threshold for
SEC Action Against Lawyers, 9 SEC. REG. L. J. 293 (1981).
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Act periodic filings, and letters to shareholders." 5 The SEC found that
Carter and Johnson each had an affirmative obligation to correct Nathe
tional Telephone's disclosure violations, including either to approach
16
rest of National Telephone's board of directors or to resign.
Initially, the SEC's administrative law judge sanctioned Carter and
Johnson under Rule 2(e) for aiding and abetting National Telephone's
violations of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and for engaging in "unethical
[and] improper professional conduct.""17 The administrative law judge
embraced a "red flags theory" that had been the basis of prior SEC actions against attorneys, saying that incidents involving National Telephone "should have, at least, served as red flags to alert respondents to
some course of action which would have prevented the violations found
herein.' 1 8 This theory by its very nature sought to incorporate a negligence standard into Rule 2(e) proceedings against attorneys.
In its final decision, however, the full Commission reversed the administrative law judge and dismissed the charges against Carter and Johnson.
The Commission explicitly stated that the two attorneys "could not be
sanctioned under Rule 2(e)(1)(iii) for willfully aiding and abetting [a client's securities law] violations unless they 'were aware or knew that their
role was part of an activity that was improper or illegal." ' 119 The Commission went on to read a scienter standard into Rule 2(e) by saying that
"wrongful intent provides the basis for distinguishing between those professionals who may be appropriately considered as subjects of professional discipline and those who, acting in good faith, have merely made
errors of judgment or have been careless.' 120 The SEC's reversal of its
position on intent led one commentator to observe that "[i]ndeed, if the
Commission in authorizing the initiation of the Carter-Johnsoncase had
applied the same standards that it pronounced at its conclusion, it is most
doubtful whether it would ever have authorized the institution of this action in the first place."'1 21 This was not the first time, nor the last, that the
SEC would be accused of switching standards midstream in proceedings
against professionals.
The SEC did not sanction Carter and Johnson under Rule 2(e) because
it believed standards for professional conduct in securities practice had
115. In re Carter & Johnson, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17597, 11981 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
Johnson].

82,847, at 84,145 (Feb. 28, 1981) [hereinafter Carter &

116. Id.

117. Id. at 84,173; see also SEC Procedural
§ 201.102(e)(1)(ii) (1996).

Rules §2(e)(1)(ii),

118. In re Carter, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(Mar. 7, 1979); see also Kronstein, supra note 114, at 295.

17 C.F.R.

82,175, at 82,179

119. Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Carter & Johnson,

supra note 115, at 84,167).
120. Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 484. If a securities lawyer is to exercise his "best independent judgment ... he must have the freedom to make innocent-or even, in certain cases,
careless-mistakes without fear of [losing] the ability to practice before the Commission."

Id.
121. Kronstein, supra note 114, at 295.
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not yet been satisfactorily developed. 122 It is surprising that the SEC
would acknowledge at this juncture, almost fifty years after enactment of
the 1933 Act, that it did not feel justified in sanctioning lawyers because it
had yet to satisfactorily develop clear standards for what lawyers must do
when confronted with client noncompliance with the securities laws. Instead, the SEC articulated standards that lawyers presumably must adhere to in the future:
[W]hen a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation
of a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the
federal securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in a
substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure requireunments, his continued participation violates professional standards
12 3
noncompliance.
client's
the
end
to
steps
prompt
less he takes
Despite its retreat on the issue of intent, the SEC apparently sought to
place an affirmative duty on a lawyer to halt a client's continued noncompliance with the securities laws. Securities lawyers thus must abide
not only by rules of professional responsibility, such as Model Rule
1.2(d), which prohibits a lawyer from assisting a client in a crime or
fraud, 124 but also by the arguably higher standard imposed by the SEC in
Carter & Johnson.
Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear from the Carter & Johnson release exactly what these higher standards are. The SEC did say that a
lawyer in such a situation must take "prompt steps to end the client's
noncompliance," and suggested two steps that Carter and Johnson could
have taken: (1) approaching other members of National Telephone's
board of directors; and (2) resigning. However, it is questionable
whether it would have been sufficient for the lawyers only to approach
some of the other directors; arguably, Carter and Johnson would have
been required to go to the full board. If the full board failed to rectify the
situation, were the lawyers required to resign? If the lawyers did resign,
were they required to do anything to disavow the work product they had
done for National Telephone? All of these questions went unanswered,
presumably to be determined the next time the SEC sought to sanction
an attorney under Rule 2(e).
However, after Carter & Johnson the SEC avoided answering these
questions by retreating further from the forefront of defining lawyers'
professional obligations through Rule 2(e) proceedings. In fact, the
Carter & Johnson proceeding was the last time the SEC used administrative proceedings to determine de novo a securities lawyer's professional
obligations. 125 Since Carter & Johnson, the SEC has only begun Rule
122. Carter & Johnson, supra note 115, at 84,173.
123. Carter & Johnson, supra note 115, at 84,172.
124. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1995).
125. Emerson, supra note 29, at 213. "With respect to attorneys, the Commission generally has not sought to develop or apply independent standards of professional conduct
... the Commission, as a matter of policy, generally refrains from using its administrative
forum to conduct de novo determinations of the professional obligations of attorneys."
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already been found to have
2(e) proceedings against attorneys who have
126
violated the securities laws in some way.

B.

IN RE KERN

In In re Kern, the SEC claimed that George Kern "caused" his client
Allied Signal to violate Section 14 of the 1934 Act. 127 Kern served as an
attorney and board member for Allied Corporation when the company,
while the subject of a tender offer, began negotiations with a "white
knight." Under the Williams Act, this event had to be disclosed to the
29
SEC.128 Allied failed to disclose the negotiations with the new suitor.
An administrative law judge found that Kern had assumed responsibility
for determining when an amendment to Allied's Schedule 14D-9 would
be filed: "When Kern accepted discretionary authority to make [decisions
regarding whether amendments to Allied's Schedule 14D-9 were required] he also accepted the responsibility the Allied officers [otherwise
would have had] for compliance with Rule 14D-9.' 30 Arguably, Kern's
own choice to accept the responsibility for disclosure triggered the requirement that he disclose to the SEC all material facts, including the
merger negotiations.' 3 ' However, the question arises of whether the SEC
would have sought to sanction Kern if he had not been a director of Allied as well as its lawyer. Also, Kern's potentially career damaging mistake was to make an arguably wrong decision about the timing of
disclosure in a fast-paced hostile takeover situation. Securities lawyers
have reason to be concerned that the SEC may pursue further actions
against lawyers whose mistake is not a wrong decision of whether to disclose, but a wrong decision on the more difficult question of when to disclose. 132 Even more troubling is the vague question of when a lawyer is a
"cause" of a client's violation of the securities laws, language that subsequently became even more important with its inclusion in the Remedies
133
Act.
SEC Final Rule on Rule 2(e) Proceedings, Exchange Act Release No. 25,893, [1987-88
Transfer Binder] Fed. Rec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,248, at 84,244 (July 7, 1988).
126. Emerson, supra note 29, at 213 n.292. At a meeting on July 7, 1988, SEC General
Counsel David Golzar explained that "it has been commission policy for the last seven
years to only bring 2(e) proceedings against an attorney if he or she previously has been
involved in another enforcement action." Id.
127. In re Kern, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-6869, [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,342, at 89,580 (Nov. 14, 1988), affd in part, vacated
in part, 50 S.E.C. 596 (1991) [hereinafter Kern].
128. Id. at 89,584.
129. Id. at 89,580-82.
130. Id. at 89,592.
131. This case was later dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, thus the holding was never
expressly ratified by the SEC. Id. at 89,595-96. Under the 1990 Remedies Act, which was
enacted after Kern, the SEC would now have jurisdiction.
132. The Remedies Act, supra note 5, authorizes actions against persons who are a
"cause" of a violation and thus removes the jurisdictional impediment that eventually terminated the proceedings against Kern.
133. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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THE SALOMON BROTHERS CASE

In In re Gutfreund, Salomon Brothers' chief legal officer (in-house
counsel) Donald M. Feuerstein repeatedly advised CEO John H. Gutfreund to report to the government falsified bids for United States treasury securities by trader Paul Mozer. 134 Gutfreund did not report the
falsified bids to the SEC. 135 The SEC determined that Feuerstein, because his role as chief legal officer of Salmon Brothers caused him to
became a "supervisor" of Mozer for purposes of Sections 15(b)(4)(E) and
15(b)(6) of the 1934 Act, was obligated under the 1934 Act's provisions
regulating broker dealers to take appropriate steps to deal with Mozer's
misconduct. 136 The SEC suggested that such appropriate steps would include approaching senior management, and if that failed, approaching the
board of directors, resigning, or disclosing the misconduct to
137
regulators.
The SEC did note, however, that where the supervisor was an attorney,
the "applicable Code of Professional Responsibility and Cannons of Ethics may bear upon what course of conduct that individual may properly
pursue.' 38 Thus, confidentiality rules might limit disclosure by an attorney, particularly in jurisdictions that adhere to Model Rule 1.6.139 This
raises the question of whether the SEC expects an attorney to disclose
illegal acts everywhere except jurisdictions that prohibit disclosure, a particularly troublesome prospect when many corporate clients have offices
in several states and it is not always entirely clear which jurisdiction's
rules of professional conduct apply. In re Gutfreund also raises the question of whether the SEC would impute the same responsibilities to a general counsel at any publicly held corporation that it did in this case to the
general counsel at a broker dealer.
In In re Gutfreund, the SEC once again set forth its view of what an
attorney's obligations were without imposing a sanction. One wonders
why the SEC is so hesitant to impose sanctions. Is the SEC merely waiting for the right combination of circumstances to appear before imposing
serious sanctions on an attorney who has failed to live up to the espoused
standards? Alternatively, does the SEC itself recognize that the standards it is espousing are not precise enough to warrant sanction for departure therefrom? If so, the SEC needs to articulate its standards more
clearly, and also should recognize that, to an attorney charged with improper conduct, the potential sanction is not the only harm. Injury to an
attorney's reputation caused by the attorney being subjected to a protracted enforcement proceeding, as was George Kern, or having his con134. In re Getfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 31,554, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,067, at 83,599 (Dec. 3, 1992).
135. Id.
136. ld. at 83,609.
137. Id.
138. Id n.26; see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995)
(prohibiting disclosure of client confidences).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94.
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duct criticized in a SEC release, as was that of Donald Feuerstein, can
140
cause almost as much harm as a formal sanction.
D.

CHECKOSKY

SEC, 14 1

In Checkosky v.
the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia discussed the difference between lawyers and accountants, and criticized the SEC's unclear articulation of the standards it
would apply to each. In this case, the Commission had suspended two
partners of Coopers and Lybrand, David Checkosky and Norman Aldrich, for two years under Rule 2(e) for "improper professional conduct"
in auditing financial statements that Savin Corporation, a marketer of
photocopiers, had submitted to the Commission. 142 "The Commission alleged that Checkosky and Aldrich had misrepresented that the financial
statements were in conformity with GAAP [Generally Accepted Accounting Principles] when they certified that Savin ha[d] properly deferred its costs associated with the copier project" and "violated GAAS
[Generally Accepted Auditing Standards] by failing to exercise professional due care in planning and performing the audits and in preparing
the audit reports."' 143 The Commission then affirmed an administrative
law judge's "conclusion that the auditors had violated GAAP and GAAS
and that scienter is not required to state a violation of Rule 2(e)(1)(ii)and noted that the auditor's conduct did in fact rise to the level of
recklessness.'"

44

Checkosky and Aldrich argued that the Commission did not have the
authority to administer a Rule 2(e) proceeding, but this argument had
been rejected before by the courts. 14 5 Alternatively, they argued that
"even if the Commission may police practitioners before it, its authority
does not extend to disciplining professionals for negligence."' 146 This issue had not been addressed by appellate courts, and was not to be ad140. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
141. 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
142. Id. at 454-55.
143. Id. at 455.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 582 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Rule 2(e),
promulgated according to its statutory rulemaking authority, represents an attempt by the
Commission to protect its own processes."). As Judge Silberman observed in Checkosky:
[T]he Court in Touche clearly distinguished the Commission's authority to
discipline professionals from its substantive enforcement functions ... since
under the 1934 Act's jurisdictional provisions, 15 U.S.C. Section 78aa (1988),
district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the securities
laws. The Commission had promulgated Rule 2(e) not to augment its enforcement arsenal but to protect its administrative processes, and the Court
correctly recognized that the Commission may not "usurp the jurisdiction of
the federal courts to deal with 'violations' of the securities laws."
Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 456 (citations omitted).
146. Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 456. As Judge Silberman points out, "[T]his argument has
not been squarely addressed by the courts of appeals." Id. (citing Davy v. SEC, 792 F.2d
1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986) (reserving judgment on what level of culpability is required)).
However, "[o]ne district court has addressed the issue and held that Davy necessarily determined that the Commission's authority under Rule 2(e) extends to all mental states of
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dressed here because the Commission did not clearly state that it was
disciplining Checkosky and Aldrich for negligence. The Commission
found that Checkosky and Aldrich had "violated GASS and misrepresented that Savin's statements complied with GAAP"'14 7 and stated that
"[w]e affirm the [administrative] law judge's holding (and reaffirm prior
Commission precedent) that proof of bad faith or wilful misconduct is not
a prerequisite for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule
2(e)(1)(ii)."'1 48 Nonetheless, as Judge Silberman points out, "the Commission's opinion is ambiguous. The Commission declared that bad faith
is not a prerequisite for a violation, but does not specify the state of mind
both necessary and sufficient to constitute a violation in light of its past
precedents.' 1 49 It was "unclear whether the Commission actually applied
a simple negligence standard in this case-or, for that matter, what standard the Commission actually did apply."' 150
The court, in a two sentence per curium opinion, ordered that the case
be "remanded to the Commission for a more adequate explanation of its
15
interpretation of Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) and its application in this case.' '
Judge Silberman, in a separate opinion, elaborated on the difficulty of
reviewing a Commission disciplinary order where the Commission did
not make clear the applicable standard of culpability:
The Commission has variously indicated that different levels of
mental culpability are needed to make out a 2(e)(1)(ii) violation by
professionals (lawyers or auditors): simple negligence as the Commission privately held in Schulzetenberg; gross negligence implied by
the "so deficient" language of Haskins & Sells; recklessness hinted
by the Commission in its opinion below; or willfulness or bad faith
suggested by Logan and Carter [& Johnson]. I think the Commission must choose its standard and forthrightly apply it to this case.
Given the enormous impact on accountants-and lawyers-that the
Rule has, and in fairness to petitioners, the Commission must be precise in declaring the standard against which petitioners' conduct is
52
measured and exactly why that conduct violated the standard.
Absent a clearer articulation of what standard the Commission actually
was seeking to apply, it would be premature for a reviewing court to decide whether
the Commission has authority to sanction merely negligent
conduct:1 53
culpability." Id. n.4 (citing Danna & Dentinger v. SEC, No. C-93-4158, 1994 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 7256 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 8, 1994)).
147. Id. at 458.
148. Id.
149. Id.

150. Id. at 456.
151. Id. at 454.

152. Id. at 462.
153.
If the Commission were to determine that an accountant's negligence is a per
se violation of Rule 2(e), it would have to consider not only the administrative burden such a position would entail but also whether it would constitute
a de facto substantive regulation of the profession and thus raise questions of
the legitimacy of Rule 2(e)(1)(ii)-or at least its scope.
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This is doubtless an important case regarding the SEC's authority to
regulate the conduct of professionals practicing before the Commission.... I think the Commission should state clearly and without

equivocation its decisional standard with respect to "improper proRule 2(e) and how petitioner's conduct viofessional conduct" under
154
lated that standard.
Judge Randolph's opinion in Checkosky underscored another problem
with the Commission's approach to Rule 2(e) proceedings, the Commission's failure to clearly articulate whether it was applying a different state
of mind criteria to accountants than to lawyers, and if so, why. Thirteen
years earlier, the Commission had issued its release in Carter & Johnson,
stating that attorneys "could not be sanctioned under Rule 2(e)(1)(iii) for
willfully aiding and abetting [a client's securities law] violations unless
they 'were aware or knew that their role was part of an activity that was
improper or illegal,""u 55 and that "wrongful intent" was a "basis for distinguishing between those professionals who may be appropriately considered as subjects of professional discipline and those who, acting in
good faith, have merely made errors of judgment or have been careless."'1 56 In Checkosky, however, the Commission applied a different
standard to the two accountants, stating that "scienter is not required to
state a violation of Rule 2(e)(1)(ii).' 57 As Judge Randolph observes,
why the principles set forth in Carter& Johnson "would not apply equally
to auditors prosecuted under Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) for 'improper professional
conduct' is far from evident. The Commission's opinion in this case does
nothing to answer the question.' 158 Although there are some very good
reasons for applying a scienter rather than a negligence standard to lawyers in SEC disciplinary proceedings, many of the same reasons apply to
accountants as well. As Judge Randolph observes:
[Carter& Johnson] said that without a scienter requirement, lawyers
would slant their advice out of fear of incurring liability, and management therefore would not consult them on difficult questions. I
cannot see why this sort of reasoning would not apply as well to audiId. at 459.
154. Id. at 465-66.

155. Id. at 484 (quoting Carter & Johnson, supra note 115, at 84,167).
156. Id. at 484. "The Commission reasoned that if a securities lawyer is to exercise his
'best independent judgment... he must have the freedom to make innocent-or even, in
certain cases, careless-mistakes without fear of [losing] the ability to practice before the
Commission."' Id.
157. Id. at 455.
158. Id. at 484. As Judge Randolph points out, the SEC in the proceedings below had
observed that the Carter release addressed "the standard for willful aiding and abetting
liability under Rule 2(e)(1)(iii), a provision not at issue in [Checkosky]." Id.
[However,] earlier in its Carteropinion, the Commission stated that subsections (i), (ii) and (iii) of Rule 2(e)(1) were of a piece. Each subsection shared
the 'same focus'; each 'reflect[ed] the same concerns'; and each was directed
at the same goal of protecting the 'integrity of the Commission's processes.'
Since 'wrongful intent' distinguishes those 'professionals' worthy of suspension from those who should not be sanctioned, as Carterindicated, one is left
to wonder why it matters which of Rule 2(e)(1)'s subsections is involved.
Id. (citations omitted).
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tors.... Encouraging management to be completely candid with its
auditor about difficult accounting issues may be just as desirable as
encouraging management to consult candidly with outside lawyers,
and for similar reasons. If imposing discipline on lawyers for negligence would be counterproductive, as [Carter & Johnson] determined, it is not immediately apparent
why the same would not be
159
true with respect to accountants.
On appeal, the Commission argued that "lawyers owe a duty to their
1 60
client whereas accountants owe a duty directly to the investing public."'
161
However, Judge Randolph found that "the point is elusive,"' and that
"the federal securities laws do not make culpability turn on the nature of
the professional."' 162 Indeed, before the Commission decided the Checkosky case, it was "said with confidence that '[n]either Rule 2(e), nor the
courts' recognition of it, ha[s] ever drawn a distinction between accountants and attorneys." 1 63 Most important, "if the Commission intends to
draw that distinction now, for the first time in its history, it must articulate a rationale for doing so and it must explain why the varying roles of
accountants and lawyers translate into varying standards under a rule that
makes the same language applicable to both."'164 Judge Randolph concluded with the frustrated observation that Carter & Johnson "points in
one direction, this case in another" and concurred in the court's decision
65
to remand the case so that the Commission could justify its decision.'

E.

DANNA

& DENTINGER

In In re Angelo P. Danna & Mark P. Dentinger,166 the SEC sought to
impose sanctions under Rule 2(e) on two accountants at Arthur Young &
Company in connection with the audit for fiscal 1986 for ILC Technology
("ILC"):
The report, issued December 10, 1986, stated that the examination
had been conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS) and that the financial statements presented ILC's
financial position in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP). On January 13, 1987, ILC included this clean or
unqualified report in its annual report on Form 10-K with the Com159. Id.; but see U.S. v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984) (rejecting analogy between attorney-client and accountant-client communications).
160. Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 486 (citing Securities and Exchange Commission brief).
161. Id.
162. Id. "Accountants, for example, cannot be held liable under section 10(b) of the
1934 Act for negligent conduct any more than lawyers can." Id.
163. Id. (quoting In re Keating, 17 SEC Docket 1149, 1165-66 n.10 (July 2, 1979) (concurring opinion of Chairman Williams)).
164. Id. at 486-87.
165. Id. at 487. Judge Randolph found that the Commission "not only neglected to
spell out what standard it had applied, but also neglected to reconcile this case with its past
decisions." Id. at 490-91. Believing the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously,
Judge Randolph urged that the Commission's order be vacated, a step with which the rest
of the court did not concur. Id.
166. In re Danna & Dentinger, Exchange Act Release No. 62, 59 SEC Docket 208
(Apr. 11, 1995) [hereinafter Danna & Dentinger].
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mission.... Less than six weeks later, on February 26, 1987, Raymond Montoya, ILC's Vice President Finance, was arrested and
charged with grand theft and embezzlement. As a result of Mr.

Montoya's embezzlement, ILC reported an aggregate $4.366 million
as the net before-tax decrease in income resulting 'from restatement
for the correction of fictitious inventory and fixed assets and accounting irregularities' in its report for the quarter ended March 31,
1987 on Form 10-Q filed on or about July 6, 1987.167

The SEC's Office of the Chief Accountant ("OCA") alleged "that the
Respondents violated GAAS with respect to the annual audit of ILC's
consolidated financial statements for fiscal 1986 because they failed to (1)
adequately plan and supervise the audit, (2) obtain sufficient competent
evidence, (3) detect errors and irregularities, and (4) exercise due profes1 68
sional care."'
Danna and Dentinger sought to enjoin the SEC from commencing

Rule 2(e) proceedings against them without alleging bad faith on their
part. The Federal District Court for the Northern District of California
denied their motion, stating that the SEC's "authority under Rule 2(e) ...
is not limited to instances in which improper professional conduct is alleged to have been committed in bad faith, but extends to all situations in
which improper professional conduct is alleged which may impair the integrity of the Commission's processes.' 69 The district court noted that
"[t]he Commission reasonably distinguished between the duties of attorneys in representing clients and the duties of accountants in certifying
70
SEC filings in Checkosky."'
SEC Chief Administrative Law Judge Brenda Murray's subsequent
findings of law and fact in Danna & Dentinger, however, were made
167. Id. at 209-10.
168. Id. at 212-13.
Specifically the OCA alleges that Respondents did not conduct an audit in
accordance with GAAS because:
1. [T]hey failed to adequately plan the audit with respect to the cash and
fixed assets accounts; they failed to adequately plan or perform audit procedures to search for errors or irregularities with respect to the cash account;
they failed to properly investigate potential errors or irregularities in the
fixed assets account; and they failed to adequately plan the audit of the inventory account to search for errors or irregularities (First Standard of Field
Work, SAS 1, SAS 16, SAS 22);
2. [T]hey failed to supervise the audit of the cash and fixed assets accounts, and Mr. Danna failed to supervise Mr. Dentinger with respect to the
inventory account (SAS 1, SAS 22);
3. [T]hey failed to acquire sufficient competent audit evidence concerning
cash disbursements, fixed assets, and inventory (First Standard of Field
Work, SAS 1, SAS 31), and
4. [T]hey failed to exercise due professional care. (Third General Standard, SAS 1) (OCA's Post-trial Brief).
Id.
169. Danna & Dentinger v. SEC, No. C-93-4158, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7256, *3 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 8, 1994).
170. Id. at *10. The district court in Danna & Dentinger issued its ruling prior to the
District of Columbia's remand of Checkosky for a more definitive articulation of the culpability standard. See Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 454.
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against the backdrop of the District of Columbia Circuit's 1994 opinion
remanding Checkosky to the SEC for more adequate explanation. Judge
Murray stated:
I have applied a negligence standard, i.e., the failure to use such
care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under
similar circumstances; the doing of some act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under similar circumstances or
ordinary prudence would have done
failure to do what a person of
171
under similar circumstances.
Judge Murray went on to state that:
Auditors are persons who based on education, experience, and
professional licenses hold themselves out as capable of performing a
specialized service at a level which meets GAAS and GAAP....
When auditors fail to meet these minimum standards established
by their peers they are negligent. Thousands of publicly held companies are required to file financial statements with the Commission
under a regulatory process that has proven to be effective. For the
process to work, the filings must conform to a clearly defined and
generally accepted level of competence. That standard is the level of
accepted professionalism which the accounting and auditing professions have set for themselves in the GAAS and GAAP. To do less is
negligent because it does not fulfill the performance
level required of
172
a reasonably prudent and careful auditor.
Finding "that Respondents have committed unprofessional conduct,"
Judge Murray suspended Danna from appearing or practicing before the
173
SEC for one year and Dentinger for six months.
In applying the negligence standard, Judge Murray responds to Judge
Silberman's request in Checkosky for a more definite standard by defining and applying a negligence standard for Rule 2(e) proceedings against
accountants. However, she does not clearly articulate why a negligence
standard is appropriate in a Rule 2(e) proceeding other than to state that,
"[f]or the [disclosure] process to work, the filings must conform to a
clearly defined and generally accepted level of competence.' 1 74 In addition, Judge Murray does not directly address Judge Randolph's observations in Checkosky that the SEC had applied a scienter standard to
lawyers in Carter & Johnson and that "[t]he federal securities laws do not
make culpability turn on the nature of the professional."' 175 The Danna
& Dentinger opinion thus does not address the applicable standard for
lawyers and why the standard for accountants should be different. It is
true that "[a]uditors are persons who based on education, experience,
and professional licenses hold themselves out as capable of performing a
171. Danna & Dentinger,supra note 166, at 213 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICtiONARY 249
(6th ed. 1990)).
172. Danna & Dentinger,supra note 166, at 213.
173. Danna & Dentinger,supra note 166, at 244.
174. Danna & Dentinger,supra note 166, at 213.
175. Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 486.
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specialized service,"' 176 but the same is true of lawyers. One is left wondering whether, if Judge Murray were to decide the Carter & Johnson
case, she would apply a negligence standard there as well.
VI. LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION OF THE STANDARD
FOR ACCOUNTANTS
Title III, Section 301 of the 1995 Reform Act' 77 amends the 1934
Act 178 by inserting a Section 10A specifying procedures for accountant
detection and disclosure of corporate fraud. Section 10A provides that
each audit performed pursuant to the 1934 Act must include procedures
designed to discover illegal acts having a material effect on financial statements and to identify related party transactions.' 79 In relevant part the
new section provides that:
Each audit required pursuant to this title of the financial statements
of an issuer ... shall include ... procedures designed to provide
reasonable assurance of detecting illegal acts that would have a direct and material effect on the determination of financial statement
amounts . . . [and] procedures designed to identify related party
transactions that are material to the financial statements ... 180
Thus, under the new act, accountants must implement procedures to discover illegal acts of their clients. The procedures must be aimed at finding illegal acts that would be material to the financial statements,
presumably under the materiality standard applied elsewhere in the 1934
Act.18'
In addition, the 1995 Reform Act requires accountants who discover
information indicating that an illegal act may have occurred to determine
the likelihood that the illegal act has in fact occurred, determine the possible effect of the illegal act on the financial statements of the corporation, and report the illegal act to the appropriate level of management
unless such act is clearly inconsequential.18 2 If the accountant does report to management under this new section, and remains unsatisfied that
management has remedied the problem, then the accountant must go to
the full board of directors.' 83 The statute then requires the board to disclose the illegal act to the SEC within one day of the accountant's report. 184 If the board does not disclose the illegal act to the SEC, the
statute requires disclosure by the accountant to the SEC. 85 Thus, the
176. Danna & Dentinger,supra note 166.
177. H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1996).
179. See 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301.
180. 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301.
181. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("An omitted fact
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider
it important in deciding how to vote.").
182. See 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301(b)(1).
183. See 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301(b)(2).
184. See 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301(b)(3).
185. See 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301(b)(3)(B).
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mandatory disclosure requirement leaves virtually no opportunity for the
board to rectify the illegal act once notified. In fact, it hardly gives the
board an opportunity to verify the report prior to informing the SEC unless the board has prior knowledge of the problem. Although such a procedure may be appropriate for accountants charged with a "watchdog"
function, it would not be appropriate for lawyers, whose fiduciary duty to
their clients presumably requires them to allow a board of directors time
to rectify and/or disclose an illegal act prior to disclosure by the lawyers
to the SEC.
The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference explains the effect of the 1995 Reform Act's fraud detection and disclosure
provisions on accountants:
The Conference Report requires independent public accountants to
adopt certain procedures in connection with their audits and to inform the SEC of illegal acts. These requirements would be carried
out in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards for audits of SEC registrants-as modified from time to time by the Commission-on the detection of illegal acts, related party transactions
and relationships,186and evaluation of an issuer's ability to continue as
a going concern.
Section 1OA(d) provides that the SEC may, in the event of a violation of
these provisions, enter a cease and desist order under Section 21C of the
1934 Act or "impose a civil penalty against the independent public accountant and any other person that the Commission finds was a cause of
such violation" under the standards in Section 21B. 187 Furthermore, the
conference committee never intended to affect the SEC's authority in
areas not specifically addressed by the legislation.' 88 Therefore, Rule
2(e) proceedings against accountants should not be directly affected,
although substantial departure from the 1995 Reform Act's procedures
for detection and disclosure of client fraud presumably would be "improper professional conduct" within the meaning of Rule 2(e)(1)(ii).
Although the statute does not specifically address standards of culpability, there is no indication that mere negligence excuses departure from
the procedures mandated therein. Insofar as failure to carry out the procedures required by Section 10A is concerned, the standard for accountant culpability that is at issue in Checkosky and Danna & Dentinger
appears resolved in favor of negligence.
Although one might expect auditors to oppose these provisions, objections from the accounting profession focused principally on earlier proposals that the audit procedures specified in Section 10A be set "in

186. See 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee
of Conference, Auditor Disclosure of Corporate Fraud, at 43 [hereinafter Joint Statement].
187. 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301(d).
188. Joint Statement, supra note 186, at 43.
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accordance with methods prescribed by the Commission.' 1 89 Once this
language was amended to refer to "generally accepted auditing standards,

as may be modified or supplemented by the Commission," the AICPA
supported the legislation. 190 In addition to the limitations on accountant

liability discussed more fully below, one reason for the profession's support may have been the legislation's clarification of standards that would
be applied in cases of accountant liability' 9 ' and discipline.
In particular, the new provision specified exactly what auditors must do
to confront client fraud. As pointed out above, while accountants are

governed by their profession's confidentiality rules, they may be required
192
to disclose confidential information in compliance with other laws.

The new language of Section 10A requires auditors to implement procedures under GAAS and to forego keeping a client confidence when a

client's management fails to rectify material illegal acts. 193 The Tenth

Circuit in Windon conditioned a duty to disclose on a "fiduciary or other

similar relation of trust and confidence" between the plaintiff and defend-

ant 194 and the Eleventh Circuit said in Rudolph that such a duty could
arise out of the "circumstances" of each case. 195 Section 10A instead specifically defines when an auditor has a duty to disclose and to whom. The

chosen rules are substantially similar to, and do not conflict with, the

rules that the profession has already made for itself.196 Perhaps most im189. H.R. 574, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), quoted in Quinton F. Seamons, Address
Before the Business Law Section, Law and Accounting Committee (Mar. 30, 1996) (manuscript on file with the SMU Law Review) [hereinafter Seamons].
190. The AICPA said that the measure "should bolster public confidence in the nation's
financial reporting system by requiring auditors to provide earlier public notification of
possible misconduct." Amended Fraud Detection Bill Approved by House Subcommittee,
25 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 400 (Mar. 19, 1993). Representative Edward Markey (DMass) commented that the bill also enjoyed the support of the Big Six accounting firms.
Kerry Introduces FinancialFraudBill with Safe Harborfor Whistleblowers, 25 Sec. Reg. L.
Rep. (BNA) 500 (Apr. 2, 1993).
191. Section 203 of the 1995 Reform Act specifically states that "[n]othing in this Act
...shall be deemed to create or ratify any private right of action," and an accountant thus
presumably could not be sued by a private plaintiff for a violation of § 10A alone. However, the mandate in § 10A could be very relevant to existing causes of action discussed in
the text accompanying notes 56-74 supra. In particular, courts are unlikely to find that
accountants who establish that they complied with § 10A when confronted with client
fraud did not perform any duty they might have had to disclose.
192. See discussion supra part III.A.
193. See 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 67-74.
196. There are 171 procedures for detecting and disclosing client fraud. See AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS

53 (1988). Section 10A(b) of the 1934 Act, added by the 1995 Reform Act, requires auditors to implement procedures for notifying a registrant's board of directors that are essentially similar to the procedures in SAS 54 (illegal act by clients). SAS 54 also notes that
"[dlisclosure to the Securities Exchange Commission may be necessary if, among other
matters, the auditor withdraws because the board of directors has not taken appropriate
remedial action. Such failure may be a reportable disagreement on Form 8-K." Id. at 54
n.3; see also id. at 59 (auditor's consideration of entity's ability to continue as going concern). "The Reform Act did not identify any new substantive areas that had not already
been considered by the accounting profession. What is new is that the SEC now has express authority to modify or supplement audit standards in these three areas [illegal acts,
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portant, at least everyone knows what the rules are.
Congressman, now Senator, Ron Wyden,197 the sponsor of the Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act, observed in March of 1995:
When this bill becomes law, auditors and executives will be put on
notice that while companies may pay for auditors, they do not own
them. Investors and taxpayers will sleep better knowing that financial statements describing a company's financial condition reflect reality, not funhouse mirrors.
Accountants sometimes don't find irregularities because current
auditing standards do not require them to look sufficiently hard for
fraud. The fraud detection system provisions in the Financial Fraud
and Disclosure Act will toughen auditing standards by requiring accountants to look harder for material fraud and related party transactions. Auditors will also be expected to evaluate whether there is
substantial doubt about a company's ability to continue as a viable
concern.
This legislation will not impose new regulatory burdens on public
companies, but it will significantly help protect investors and taxpayers, which is why the SEC and state securities regulators have historically supported this legislation. To its substantial credit, the
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants has also come
1 98
out in support of this bill.
A critical objective of the Act was not only to require auditors to do a
better job, but also to use auditors to change the ethical standards among
registrants:
The Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act will change the
psychology in the corporate suites of would-be dishonest companies.
It will put managers on notice that if they commit fraud, it is more
likely to be discovered by auditors, and if the auditors do detect
fraud, they cannot be coerced into silence.
Restoring the historical independence of the accounting profession
and toughening up its procedures will put well-armed auditors back
where they belong-on the front lines protecting the public against
financial fraud. 199
Indeed, the new mandate of Section 10A might make auditors' services
more valuable by strengthening their position as reputational intermediaries for their clients. 20 0
related party transactions, and going concern evaluations], if not generally." Seamons,
supra note 189, at 1. Perhaps even more important, "generally accepted auditing standards, as may be modified or supplemented by the Commission" are now specifically incorporated into the 1934 Act and can be enforced by the SEC as such. 1995 Reform Act,
supra note 6, § 301(a)(1).
197. Senator Wyden is a democrat from Oregon.
198. Ron Wyden, Requiring Auditors Who Really Audit, ROLL CALL AssOCIATES (Mar.
27, 1995).
199. Id.
200. Investors rely on "reputational intermediaries," such as bond rating agencies, investment advisors, and investment banks to cost effectively tap into the information market on their behalf. Underwriter liability under § 11 of the 1933 Act, by bonding due
diligence work of investment bankers, actually increases the value of investment bankers'
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The 1995 Reform Act's quid pro quo for accountants is in Title II, Section 201. This provision eliminates joint and several liability in securities
fraud litigation except for defendants who engage in knowing fraud.2 01 A
system of proportionate liability is introduced whereby a "covered person
against whom a final judgement is entered in a private action shall be
liable solely for the portion of the judgement that corresponds to the per° This portion
centage of responsibility of that covered person. 2 02
is determined by a judge or jury after specific findings as to "the percentage of
responsibility of such person, measured as a percentage of the total fault
of all persons who caused or contributed to the loss incurred by the plaintiff."' 20 3 Although the definition of "covered person" is broadly defined
to include "a defendant in any private action arising under this title [the
1934 Act]," accountants will benefit immensely from thus escaping joint
and several liability for frauds that are mostly the work of their clients.2 0 4
VII.

PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION OF THE
DISCLOSURE STANDARD FOR LAWYERS

Lawyers have not been affected as much as accountants by joint and
several liability in securities class actions, 20 5 but lawyers will also benefit
from proportionate liability. Because lawyers do not have fraud detection and disclosure responsibilities imposed on them in the 1995 Reform
Act, it might appear that lawyers are getting a "free ride" into proportionate liability. However, precisely the opposite is true. As discussed in
Parts IV and V of this Article, confusion over the responsibilities of lawyers faced with client fraud makes a securities lawyer's ride through a
civil suit, much less SEC disciplinary proceedings, anything but free.
Specification of the lawyer's responsibilities would provide the lawyer
with valuable defenses in both civil suits and disciplinary proceedings.
Furthermore, while lawyers have statistically lower exposure to monetary
damages than accountants, their exposure to losses of reputational capital
is significantly greater.20 6 Thus, while proportionate liability reduces poreputations, and this "reputational intermediary" function justifies a significant part of the
underwriting fees paid to investment bankers. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 620 (1984). Accountants and
lawyers bound by appropriate rules for detection and disclosure of client fraud could also
be valuable reputational intermediaries.
201. "Any covered person against whom a final judgment is entered in a private action
shall be liable for damages jointly and severally only if the trier of fact specifically determines that such covered person knowingly committed a violation of the securities laws."
1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 201 2(A) (1995).
202. 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 201(2)(B)(i).
203. 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 201(3)(A)(ii).
204. The 1995 Reform Act extends this system of proportionate liability to outside directors of issuers sued under § 11 of the 1933 Act by including in the definition of covered
person a defendant in "any private action arising under section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933, who is an outside director of the issuer of the securities that are the subject of the
action." 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 201(10)(C)(ii).
205. See Marino & Marino, supra note 10, at 163; see supra text accompanying notes 7582.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
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tential judgments against lawyers, it does not salvage the reputation of a

lawyer subject to a civil suit or SEC disciplinary proceeding. In addition,
proportionate liability does not give practicing lawyers what they need
most, a clear articulation of what responsibilities they have upon discovering that a client is violating the securities laws. The proposal described
below seeks to provide some of the needed clarity by amending the securities laws to include rules for lawyer disclosure of client fraud.
A. DETECTION OF CLIENT FRAUD
From the outset, it is important to recognize that lawyers have a different role in securities transactions than accountants. Thus, procedures for
detection and disclosure of client fraud should be different for the two
professions. For example, under the 1995 Reform Act, "[e]ach audit required pursuant to this title of the financial statements of an issuer...
shall include ... procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of
detecting illegal acts" and "procedures designed to identify related party
transactions. ' 20 7 Lawyers, however, probably should not also be required
20 8
to exercise due diligence to detect client fraud.
Indeed, imposing a due diligence requirement on securities lawyers
could harm both lawyers and clients. First, a due diligence requirement
could change the fundamental nature of a contract for legal services. A
lawyer is an advocate
and a counselor, not an auditor doing the work of a
"public watchdog. ' 20 9 The accounting and legal professions thus perform
separate functions, and a mandatory due diligence requirement imposed
on lawyers conflates the two. Second, if high reputation lawyers were to
respond to a due diligence requirement by only representing high reputation clients, the requirement could reinforce stratification of the market
for the services of securities lawyers. 2 10 For some very risky businesses,
legal representation for securities offerings might not even be available.
207. 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301(a)(1), (2).
208. Lawyers of course have an obligation to their clients to do their job competently.
Lawyers representing an organizational client are potentially liable for negligent failure to
detect fraud on the part of an officer or employee of the organization. Nonetheless, there
is a substantial difference between malpractice liability running to a client and due diligence obligations running to the SEC or to third parties.
209. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984) (the "'public
watchdog' function demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the
client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.").
210. For example, consider underwriters, who are bound by liability under § 11 of the
1933 Act coupled with a due diligence defense. Underwriters are just as choosy about their
clients as the lawyers described in Karl Okamoto's study. See Okamoto, supra note 83.
Established underwriters on Wall Street often will not accept business from entrepreneurial and other high-risk issuers, leaving this business for regional firms. However,
this pattern is beginning to change, perhaps because courts and the Commission have in
the 60 years since passage of the 1933 Act clarified exactly what is "due diligence" for
purposes of § 11, and perhaps because of increased competitiveness in the underwriting
industry. See Frederick D. Lipman, The Best Way to Launch an Initial Public Offering,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 17, 1995, at C25. "Even large, prestigious national underwriters occasionally will underwrite a company that has minimal or no earnings or large losses, but has
great growth potential." Id.
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Thus, while issuers and their lawyers should be free to contract for lawyer due diligence running to third parties, for example through opinion
letters,2 1 ' the securities laws should not contain a provision for lawyers
similar to the 1995 Reform Act provision requiring accountants to implement "procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting
illegal acts."'2 12 A lawyer should not turn a blind eye to illegal acts, but it
is enough to require a lawyer to take appropriate steps once the lawyer
becomes "aware of information that an illegal act has occurred. '2 13 The
securities laws thus can put deliberate ignorance outside the parameters
of appropriate responses to client fraud without imposing a due diligence
obligation. The tension between the negligence standard espoused for
accountants in Danna & Dentinger2 14 and the statement in Carter& John2 15
son that "wrongful intent" is the basis for professional discipline
should be resolved for attorneys in favor of the scienter standard in
Carter & Johnson.
B.

DISCLOSURE TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

One possible approach would be to require lawyers to report illegal
acts, including failure to make required disclosures under the securities
laws, first to the appropriate officer or committee within a corporate client. Using language similar to the 1995 Reform Act provisions for accountants, the 1934 Act could require:
(1) INVESTIGATION AND REPORT TO MANAGEMENT.If, in the course of carrying out significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a registrant's compliance with disclosure requirements
under this Act, a lawyer detects or otherwise becomes aware of information indicating that an illegal act has occurred, the lawyer shall:
(A)(i) determine whether it is likely that an illegal act has occurred; and
(ii) if so, determine and consider the possible effect of the illegal
act on the disclosures made by the issuer; and
(B) as soon as practicable, inform the appropriate level of the
management of2 16 the issuer, unless the illegal act is clearly
inconsequential.
Although more precisely articulated, this proposed statutory language
imposes on securities lawyers an obligation essentially similar to obligations lawyers already have under applicable rules of professional conduct.
Model Rule 1.13, for example, states that if a lawyer representing an organization knows that a constituent of the organization is acting in violation of the law in a manner that could be harmful to the organization,
211. See Painter, supra note 39, at 259 (discussing mandatory lawyer whistleblowing

coupled with due diligence requirement as opt-in or default rule).
212. 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301(a)(1).
213. See infra text accompanying note 216.
214. Danna & Dentinger,supra note 166.
215. Carter & Johnson, supra note 115.

216. See 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301(b)(1).
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"the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of
the organization. ' 217 Under this Rule, measures the lawyer may employ
'218
include "referring the matter to higher authority in the organization.
Although this Rule does not require the lawyer to make such a report,
doing so may become necessary in certain circumstances, and the com-

ment to the Rule states that if asking the constituent to reconsider the
matter fails, "it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to take steps
'219

to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization.
The proposed statutory language also requires a report only when a
lawyer "detects or otherwise becomes aware of information indicating
that an illegal act has occurred," departing from the language in the 1995

Reform Act which requires an accountant to make a report of information indicating that an illegal act "has or may have occurred.

'220

A law-

yer need not be absolutely certain of an illegal act in order to be aware of
information indicating that such an act has occurred. The proposed language, however, is intended to emphasize that lawyers, unlike accountants, should not have an affirmative duty to seek out client fraud.
If a report to management does not remedy the situation, should a lawyer then be required to report to the full board of directors? 22 ' Although
there is some debate over whether this additional step is already required
under applicable rules of professional conduct, 222 reporting illegal acts to
the full board would clearly be the safer course of action for an attorney

seeking to avoid liability or discipline in connection with client conduct
later deemed to be fraudulent. If incorporated into the 1934 Act, such a
reporting requirement would closely mirror the accountant's reporting
requirement in the 1995 Reform Act, excluding for now the additional
requirement of reporting to the SEC:
217. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b)(1995).
218. Id.
219. Id. Rule 1.13 cmt. 4 (emphasis added). "The stated policy of the organization may
define circumstances and prescribe channels for such review, and a lawyer should encourage the formulation of such a policy." Id. Rule 1.13 cmt. 3. Essentially, the statutory
language proposed in this Article would impose on a registrant a policy requiring a lawyer
to report illegal conduct to an appropriate level of management within the organization.
220. 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301(b)(1) (emphasis added).
221. See Del. Gen. Corp. § 141(a). The board of directors runs a corporation and is
thus the logical recipient of information concerning a violation of the securities laws and
other alleged misconduct.
222. Neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code specifically require that lawyers
report illegal acts to a client's full board of directors, and bar associations have resisted
attempts by regulators to impose such a requirement. See American Bar Association,
Working Group on Lawyers' Representation of Regulated Clients Report to the House of
Delegates (1993), reprinted in INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE MATERIALS ON LAWYER AND
ACCOUNTANT LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILrTY 575 (1993) [hereinafter ABA Working
Group]. The Working Group complains that the Office of Thrift Supervision, in prosecuting actions against the attorneys for failed savings and loans, developed "novel theories of
professional responsibility" including the notion that lawyers have an obligation to report
misconduct to superiors, going "all the way to the client's board of directors." Id. at 583.
In stark contrast to the obligations that accountants are routinely assumed to have to third
parties, the Working Group believed that regulators were also wrong to "seek to impose a
duty of due diligence on lawyers with respect to the accuracy of any statements made to
federal banking agencies by the lawyers." Id. (emphasis added).
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(2) RESPONSE TO FAILURE TO TAKE REMEDIAL ACTION-If, after determining that the person or persons to whom a
report was made under paragraph 1 above, is adequately informed
with respect to illegal acts that have been detected or have otherwise
come to the attention of the lawyer in the course of the representation of the registrant, the lawyer concludes that(a) the illegal act has a material effect on the disclosure by the
registrant;
(b) the senior management has not taken, and the board of directors has not caused senior management to take, timely and appropriate remedial actions with respect to the illegal act;
directly report the lawyer's
the lawyer shall, as soon as practicable,
22 3
conclusions to the board of directors.
The principal effect of this statutory language would be to crystalize the
amorphous remedial measures suggested in Model Rule 1.13 into a
mandatory reporting obligation running ultimately to the board of
224
directors.

C.
1.

RESIGNATION AND WAVING THE RED FLAG

Resignation

Still another option would be a rule which requires a lawyer to resign if
his client refuses to correct disclosure violations or other illegal acts.
Once again, it is not entirely clear that resignation is required in such
circumstances under the Model Rules or Model Code,2 25 although the
SEC's position in Carter & Johnson seems to be that a lawyer in such

circumstances should not continue to have "significant responsibilities in
with the disclosure requirethe effectuation of a company's compliance
'226
ments of the federal securities laws."
2.

Waving the Red Flag

In addition to mandatory resignation, the rule could also require a lawyer whose client refuses to refrain from an illegal act to withdraw any
opinion letters and renounce any work product done for the client, effecting a so called "noisy withdrawal.

'227

A requirement of withdrawal cou-

223. See 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301(b)(2).
224. However, we also note that registrants should perhaps be allowed to opt out of
such a policy by delegating the board's authority over such matters to a committee or to
the general counsel of the registrant. See infra text accompanying note 242.
225. "[T]he regulators have sometimes taken the view that the lawyer must resign if his
or her efforts to prevent the wrongdoing prove unsuccessful. The Working Group again
believes this to be an incorrect reading of Rule 1.13 and Rule 1.16." ABA Working Group,
supra note 222, at 583. It is interesting to note that the ABA Working Group takes this
position, despite the fact that the ABA's own ethics opinions require a lawyer to withdraw
when her services will further a client's fraud. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 92-366 (1992) (recommends withdrawal when lawyer's
services will be used to perpetrate fraud).
226. Carter & Johnson, supra note 115, at 82,847.
227. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.6 cmt. 16 ("Neither this

Rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of
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pled with a mandatory "red flag" would perhaps read as follows:
(3) RESPONSE TO FAILURE TO TAKE REMEDIAL AC-

TION-If, after determining that the board of directors is adequately informed with respect to illegal acts that have been detected
or have otherwise come to the attention of the lawyer in the course
of the representation of the registrant, the lawyer concludes that-

(a) the illegal act has a material effect on the disclosure by the
registrant;
(b) the senior management has not taken, and the board of directors has not caused senior management to take, timely and appropriate remedial actions with respect to the illegal act;
the lawyer shall, as soon as practicable (i) resign from the representation and (ii) withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affir-

mation or similar work product for the registrant that the lawyer
believes at the time of withdrawal to be materially misleading or

likely to assist the registrant in228committing a further illegal act, including a violation of this Act.
The "red flag" under this proposed language must call attention to both

work product that is misleading at the time of withdrawal (for example, a
legal opinion that the lawyer later discovers to have been based on misrepresentations by her client) 229 and work product the registrant could
use to commit an illegal act (for example, a tax opinion which, while accurate in its description of the tax treatment of an investment, will be used
to sell securities about which the registrant has made material misstatements). 2 30 Thus, this proposed language would codify into the securities
laws the "noisy withdrawal" permitted in the comments to Model Rule
1.6. Additionally, it would require withdrawal of any opinion that a client

seeks to use for illegal purposes.
withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like."); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. No. 375 (1993); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63
OR. L. REv.455,483-84 (1984) (notice of withdrawal essentially amounts to disclosure and
thus accomplishes indirectly an objective that earlier drafts of Rule 1.6 by the Kutak Commission had sought to accomplish directly: allowing lawyers to disclose client confidences
to prevent a crime or fraud).
228. The 1995 Reform Act does not contain a similar "noisy withdrawal provision." See
1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301(b)(2).
229. Legal opinions and letters to auditors for the most part make representations
about a client's affairs at a particular moment in time, such as the closing of a loan or the
end of a fiscal year. Generally, the lawyer has no legal obligation to advise the opinion
recipient or any third party of changes of law or fact that occur after the date of the opinion letter. ABA Opinion Accord, supra note 102, at 203-04. However, if a lawyer writes
an opinion letter and later begins to doubt factual or legal representations contained
therein, he may be liable for securities fraud for allowing a client to circulate the opinion
letter to third parties. Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 848-49 (7th Cir. 1991).
230. It is generally considered unethical for a lawyer to provide even a factually and
legally correct opinion letter to a client engaged in a fraudulent transaction. "A lawyer
should not give an opinion (including one based on hypothetical facts or one that is legally
correct as to the limited matters to which it is addressed), if he knows or suspects that the
opinion is being sought to further an illegal securities transaction." Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, Report by the Special Committee on Lawyers' Role in Securities
Transactions, 32 Bus. LAW. 1879, 1887 (1977).
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DISCLOSURE TO THE
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SEC

The 1995 Reform Act requires an issuer whose board of directors receives a report from an auditor of an illegal act to inform the SEC within
one business day, and if the issuer fails to make such a report, the auditor
must itself inform the SEC.23 1 Lawyers probably should not be bound by
a similar rule because information concerning an illegal act by a client is
almost certain to involve an attorney-client confidence. Because such information is privileged, at a minimum-the lawyer should exhaust all appropriate remedies within the organizational client before going to the
SEC. It clearly would not be in keeping with professional norms for a
lawyer simultaneously to report her client's illegal acts to the board of
directors and the SEC as the 1995 Reform Act almost requires an auditor
to do.232 A lawyer should give the full board, and particularly the independent directors, 233 a chance to take remedial measures first. If a
whistleblowing requirement were to be added to the statutory language,
it should therefore read as follows:
(4) NOTICE TO THE COMMISSION.-If, after determining
that the full board of directors of the registrant is adequately informed with respect to illegal acts that have been detected or have
231. 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301(b)(3).
232. The ALI Restatement, supra note 98, does contemplate attorney whistleblowing to
persons outside an organizational client. Section 155(3) states that when "a constituent of
the organization has engaged in action or intends to act in a way that violates a legal
obligation to the organization and that will cause substantial injury to it," the lawyer may
ask the constituent to reconsider the matter, recommend that a legal opinion be sought,
and seek review by an appropriate supervisory authority within the organization (including
referral to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization). ALI Restatement, supra note 98. Up to this point, the language in the ALI Restatement is remarkably
similar to Model Rule 1.13. See supra text accompanying notes 217-19. However, the ALI
Restatement also allows the lawyer to withdraw from the representation or:
[D]isclose the breach of legal duty to persons outside the organization when
the lawyer reasonably believes that: (a) the harm to the organization of the
threatened breach is likely to exceed substantially the costs and other disadvantages of such disclosure; (b) no other measure could reasonably be taken
by the lawyer within the organization to protect its interests adequately; (c)
disclosure is reasonably likely to prevent or limit the harm to the organization in a substantial way; and (d) following reasonable inquiry by the lawyer,
no constituent of the organization who is authorized to act with respect to
the question and is not complicit in the breach is available to make a decision
about such disclosure.
In making disclosure, the lawyer must take reasonable measures to restrict
disclosure outside the organization to the extent consistent with protecting
the interest of the organization.
ALI Restatement, supra note 98, § 155(4).
233. Independent directors' concern about their own liability may cause them to demand corrective action upon learning of illegal acts. For this reason, management may
keep independent directors in the dark when illegal acts occur. See Carter & Johnson,
supra note 115, at 84,164. National Telephone's independent directors learned that National Telephone was not making the required disclosures for the first time on May 24,
1975, although Carter and Johnson had been recommending that the disclosures be made
for over a year. Carterand Johnson, supra note 115, at 84,164. On May 27, National Telephone's officers resigned and a press release was issued making the required disclosures,
causing National Telephone's stock to plummet. Carter and Johnson, supra note 115, at
84,164.
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otherwise come to the attention of the lawyer in the course of representing the registrant, the lawyer concludes that(a) the illegal act has a material effect on the disclosure by the
registrant;
(b) the board of directors has not taken timely and appropriate
remedial actions with respect to the illegal act;
the lawyer shall, as soon as practicable, (i) resign from the representation, and (ii) inform the
Commission in writing of the reasons
2 34
for the lawyer's resignation.
The last provision, in effect requiring the lawyer to "rat" on her client, is
the most controversial of our proposed amendments to the securities
laws. For this reason, the requirement that a lawyer disclose illegal client
conduct to the SEC should be either an opt-out rule or an opt-in rule.
Thus, the above statutory language should be prefaced with "[u]nless the
registrant's articles of incorporation require otherwise" (opt-out) or "[i]f
2 35
the registrant's articles of incorporation so require" (opt-in).
E.

DEFAULT RULES: OPT-IN AND OPT-OUT

As pointed out above, lawyer disclosure of client fraud to the SEC, like
"whistleblowing" generally, is probably best governed by default rules
rather than immutable rules. Immutable rules, such as a rule requiring all
lawyers to disclose illegal acts by their clients to the SEC, are inefficient if
imposed on some lawyers and clients and are likely to be ignored by lawyers who do not want to disclose. 236 Some clients will benefit from the
effect mandatory disclosure rules have on their relations with regulators,
investors, or other third parties. 2 37 For example, a rule requiring lawyer
disclosure to the SEC of illegal acts (Rule 4 above), might be preferred
by a registrant's institutional investors (securities law violations indeed
almost always involve failure to disclose to investors), or even by the
management of a registrant seeking to regain credibility after a recent
scandal. Other clients, however, will not benefit from mandatory disclosure and will purposely seek out lawyers who ignore such rules. Default
rules instead allow lawyers or clients to opt out if they do not want the
disclosure regime specified by the rules. A critical component of such an
opt-in/opt-out lawyer disclosure regime is that the default rule and any
rules chosen in its place should be disclosed ex ante (before illegal acts
238
occur) to persons who might be affected by the client's illegal acts.
If default rules are used instead of immutable rules, the next question is
who should choose the rules-lawyers or clients? Although in some situations the locus of rule choice should be the lawyer, 239 here the locus of
234. See 1995 Reform Act, supra note 6, § 301(b)(3).
235. See discussion infra part VILE.
236. See Painter, supra note 39, at 208-96.
237. Painter, supra note 39, at 224.
238. Painter, supra note 39, at 227.
239. Painter, supra note 39, at 257-58 (proposing that lawyers be allowed to choose
between different whistleblowing rules and then be required to advertise their choice).
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rule choice should be the client. Although lawyers could choose rules
and disclose their choice to clients and third parties, the existing disclosure provisions of the securities laws provide an ideal mechanism for a
registrant to choose whether to opt-out of the default rule and then to
disclose its choice in publicly available filings with the SEC.

Regulatory defaults can be set as majoritarian rules (rules that are appropriate for a majority of registrants) or as penalty default rules.(more
stringent default rules designed to encourage registrants to choose and

clearly articulate their own rules). 240 However, in many circumstances,
tailor-made rules might be too confusing or idiosyncratic. SEC regula-

tions should thus provide different alternative rules for registrants to
choose from by adopting standardized language into their articles of in-

corporation in place of the default rule specified in the statute. 241 So long
as the chosen rule is clearly stated in the registrant's articles of incorporation, the SEC could take the rule into account in deciding how much to
scrutinize the registrant's compliance with disclosure requirements. In
addition, investors could take the rule into account when valuing the reg-

istrant's securities.
1.

Opt-Out Rules
Some or all of the above provisions could be enacted as opt-out default

rules. A good example is the rule described in section B above that a
registrant's lawyer must inform the board of directors if management will
not remedy an illegal act. The statutory language should perhaps allow
the registrant to delegate the board's authority to deal with an illegal act
24 2
to a particular committee of the board or even to a particular officer.
Thus, a registrant could be allowed to opt out of lawyer disclosure to the
240. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87-130 (1989). A majoritarian rule might require
that a lawyer resign in the face of client refusal to desist from egregious misconduct. A
penalty default rule, on the other hand, might require that the lawyer disclose the misconduct to regulators.
241. Corporate law in the United States allows corporate management and shareholders to choose between a variety of forms of corporate governance by choosing where to
incorporate. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, in JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION 225-83 (1985). Lawyers
could be allowed to choose between a variety of rules of professional conduct concerning
such controversial topics as whistleblowing by opting in to professional conduct rules used
in another jurisdiction (for example, voluntarily agreeing to be bound by New Jersey's rule
requiring lawyers to disclose client confidences if necessary to prevent a crime or fraud).
See Painter, supra note 39, at 257-58.
242. The SEC has sought comment on a proposal to suggest or require that there be a
"disclosure committee" of a registrant's board of directors. See Securities Act Concepts
and Their Effects on Capital Formation IS-1022, Securities Act and Exchange Act Release
Nos. 33-7314, 34-37480, 62 S.E.C. Doc. 1046 (July 25, 1996), at 30, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,518-01
(1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240) (proposed Oct. 18, 1996). Presumably
such a committee would "improve the accuracy of disclosure," but it might "result in a
diminished oversight role for the rest of the board." Id. A registrant which establishes
such a committee might choose to opt out of the default rule of disclosure of illegal acts to
the full board and instruct its lawyers instead to inform the committee, which in turn would
be responsible for rectifying the problem or notifying the board.
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board by specifying certain alternative procedures in its articles of incorporation. For example, the articles could instead provide that the registrant's lawyers should report to the general counsel or to a compliance
committee. The "noisy withdrawal" required in section C above is another good example. A registrant should probably be allowed to opt out
of a mandatory noisy withdrawal by inserting a provision in its articles
giving discretion on noisy withdrawal back to the lawyer. Such a provision would replace the proposed statutory default rule with the rule specia lawyer may "disaffirm any
fied in Comment 16 to Model Rule 1.6. that 243
opinion, document, affirmation or the like".
2. Opt-In Rules
In addition to using opt-out default rules, the securities laws could allow registrants to amend their articles to opt in to enhanced lawyer reporting requirements. A registrant could thus amend its articles to opt in
to the last and most controversial rule discussed above: the requirement
discussed under section D that the registrant's lawyers report illegal acts
to the SEC if the board of directors does not take prompt remedial action. For example, a registrant with a large number of interested or "inside" directors might choose this option to reassure investors that
violations of securities laws will not be tolerated. Other opt-in rules
might include due diligence obligations analogous to those imposed by
the 1995 Reform Act on accountants. 2 "4
3. Opt-In vs. Opt-Out
Coasian contractual theory suggests that it does not matter whether
opt-in or opt-out rules are used. Whatever the original rule is, parties will
opt in or opt out to get to the rule they prefer. 24 5 However, game theory
might suggest that initial rule choice does matter. 246 The default rule may
become a focal point that players are unwilling to depart from by opting
out of the rule or opting in to another rule. If so, the statute could proin the default rule and allowing
mote disclosure by requiring disclosure 247
registrants to opt out for nondisclosure.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 15 (1996).
244. For example, a fraud detection rule could require that "unless [the registrant's]
lawyer, after reasonable investigation, has reasonable ground to believe and does believe
that [the registrant] has not committed and does not intend to commit a crime or fraud,
[the] lawyer shall reveal the crime or fraud and information necessary to prevent it as well
as information necessary to rectify injury to persons or property caused by [the registrant's] commission of a crime or fraud." Painter, supra note 39, at 245 (emphasis added).
Section 11 of the 1933 Act imposes a similar due diligence obligation in connection with a
registration statement on the directors of the issuer, persons signing or certifying the registration statement, and underwriters (but not lawyers). See 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)

243.

(1988).

245. The Coase theorem holds that, assuming all parties know what the default rule is
and there are no transaction costs, it does not matter which default rule is chosen. Ronald
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
246. See Painter, supra note 28, at 174.
247. Painter, supra note 28, at 188.
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4. Opting In or Opting Out in the Bylaws
Should a registrant's board of directors be allowed to amend its bylaws
to opt in or opt out of a lawyer disclosure rule? Unless the board is opting in to more disclosure than provided by the default rule, probably not.
Opting out of a default rule in the articles of incorporation must be
approved by the shareholders and directors, whereas a change in the bylaws can be approved by the directors alone. 248 Not only are shareholders excluded from the rule choice process, but, until a new bylaw is
disclosed in a press release or a securities filing, adequate information
about bylaws is less likely to be disseminated to investors than if proxies
are solicited to amend the articles. For this reason, registrants probably
should not be allowed to opt out for less disclosure than that specified in
the default rule merely by amending their bylaws (for example to require
the registrant's lawyer to report illegal acts to an officer or committee
instead of to the board). Opting in to more disclosure than required
under the default rule, however, will in most circumstances give investors
enhanced protection and should therefore be allowed by amendment to
the bylaws as well as to the articles.
5.

Will Default Rules Help Investors?

In some ways, a registrant's articles of incorporation embody a contract
with its stockholders. Investors thus may pay more for the securities of
issuers that use this contract to instruct their lawyers to report illegal conduct to an appropriate authority within the issuer and possibly to the
SEC. Alternatively, investors might pay less for securities of an issuer
that has chosen to instruct its lawyers to report illegal acts only to a particular officer within the issuer rather than to the full board of directors.
However, such a contractarian approach to legal ethics is open to the
same criticism as a contractarian approach to corporate law: namely, optin and opt-out rules are inapposite when there is no real "contract" or
when one "party," here registrants and their lawyers, chooses the rules,
and the other "party," investors, is presented with the rules on a take-itor-leave-it basis. This contractarian approach can indeed be problematic
in the corporate law context where corporate directors and officers are
entrusted with funds by large numbers of public investors. As Tamar
Frankel observes: "We should reject the view that all rules applicable to
public fiduciaries are default rules, no matter how tenuous the 'contract'
bargain around [those] rules. '249 These are valid criticisms of the contractarian approach to corporate law, particularly where fiduciary duties
248. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 10.02 (amendment of articles of incorporation
by board of directors alone only in connection with certain specified corporate formalities),
§ 10.03 (amendment of articles of incorporation by board of directors and shareholders),
§ 10.20 (amendment of bylaws by board of directors or shareholders) (1991).
249. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REv. 1209, 1267
(1995).
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established by statutory and common law are "voluntarily" waived. 2 50
However, in the area of professional responsibility, the priorities are
somewhat different. Clear standards for lawyer conduct are critical, yet
lacking, in the current regime. The current regime mandates lawyer fidu25 1
ciary duties to clients, but says little about lawyers' duties to investors.
In circumstances where different rulemaking bodies such as courts, regulators and bar associations can hardly agree on what rules ought to apply, 252 an opt-in/opt-out regime using default rules instead of mandatory
rules would at least help lawyers and regulators develop standards that
253
are effective and predictable.
6.

Is Clarity in ProfessionalDisciplineNecessarily Desirable?

Some scholars have suggested that clear default rules are not necessarily more desirable than "fuzzy" standards. Both Ian Ayres and Michael
Klausner have pointed out advantages of open-ended default standards in
the corporate law context, including the fact that such standards en'2 54
courage "building a thick common law precedent of interpretation.
In the professional ethics arena, Ian Ayres has suggested that "some substantial minority of contractors (attorneys/firms/agencies)" might:
[J]ointly prefer to have attorneys bound by some open-ended standards that attorneys must act 'reasonably,' 'in good faith,' or 'not
overreach.' While each of these standards is imprecise, it may allow
attorneys to assure their clients and the agencies that they will not in
some sense 'defect'.... Even if only ten percent of the contracting
parties jointly prefer to be bound by a standard, it might be best to
choose the standard as a default, so that a thick interpretive precedent could most easily form, and allow the remaining
ninety percent
2 55
to explicitly contract for the clarity they prefer.
Essentially, Ayres argues that lawyers might be better off with fuzzy standards as default rules because courts and agencies would build valuable
precedent interpreting those standards and, furthermore, everyone would
have an incentive to contract for clearer rules.
In the corporate law context, such a position is not only defensible, but
probably correct-jurisdictions such as Delaware have already developed
a rich body of case law interpreting standards such as "good faith," "disinterested director," and "business judgment," and this case law has constructed valuable "network externalities" around standards that might
250. For a discussion of limitations on waivers of rights to fiduciary duties, see id. at
1242-51.
251. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986);
Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d 1040 (7th Cir. 1990); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d
1104 (5th Cir. 1988). See also Painter, supra note 39, at 236-37.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 87-176.
253. See Painter, supra note 28, at 186-87.
254. Ayres, supra note 82, at 208 (commenting on Painter, supra note 28); Michael
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757
(1995).
255. Ayres, supra note 82, at 208.
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otherwise be intolerably vague. 2 56 In the professional responsibility context, however, such is not the case.
In particular, the "common law precedent of interpretation" developed
by the SEC in cases like Carter & Johnson, In re Kern, and In re Gutfreund, is thin and unpredictable, and vague standards continue to
predominate. 25 7 The precedent developed by other agencies such as the
Office of Thrift Supervision is even worse. Regulators' handling of the
savings and loan debacle demonstrated laxity toward both regulated institutions and their lawyers followed by multi-million dollar asset attachments once conduct became egregious. 258 Also, unlike disputes over
corporate law, matters of professional discipline in regulatory law practice are decided by administrative agencies, not by the courts, except occasionally as a forum of last resort reached only after a lawyer's
259
reputation and career have perhaps already been ruined by an agency.
The District of Columbia Circuit's remand of Rule 2(e) proceedings in
Checkosky v. SEC260 is but one example of how courts will wait for clear
definitions by agencies of applicable standards before they will begin the
process of judicial review. In light of the fact that agencies often settle
actions against attorneys 261 and prefer to articulate professional conduct
norms without actually sanctioning lawyers, 262 the courts undoubtedly
will wait a long time before clearly articulating standards for lawyer disclosure of corporate fraud. Thus, given the extraordinary power that
agencies have over lawyers, and the potential for abuse of that power,
using a fuzzy standard as a "penalty default" is excessively harsh on the
practicing bar. This is particularly true in circumstances where an agency
can interpret the fuzzy standard any way it wants to ex post, with little
chance of judicial review.
The ABA has already moved in precisely the opposite direction by
adopting the more concrete Model Rules and abandoning the aspirational standards of the Canons and the Ethical Considerations in the
Model Code. Even law students prefer to be governed by definitive stan256. See Klausner, supra note 254, at 773.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 114-40.
258. Painter, supra note 39, at 266. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Kaye,
Scholer, FIRREA, and the Desirabilityof Early Closure: A View of the Kaye, Scholer Case
from the Perspective of Bank Regulatory Policy, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1115, 1132-39 (1993)
(arguing that OTS charged Kaye, Scholer in part to cover up its own ineptitude). Federal
deposit insurance and criteria used to evaluate banking agencies create "strong incentives
for regulators to delay closing insolvent financial institutions. In fact, banking regulators
have strong incentives to delay identifying problem banks, to deny the severity of the
banking crisis generally, and to postpone meaningful action for as long as possible regardless of the cost." Id. at 1133.
259. The Kern case dragged on for nearly two years before the SEC dismissed the case
on jurisdictional grounds. See Kern, supra note 127.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 141-65.
261. See In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, 1992 WL 560939 (O.T.S.) (Mar. 1, 1992).
262. See Carter & Johnson, supra note 115; Kern, supra note 127; and In re Gutfreund,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-31554, 52 S.E.C. Doc. 2849 (Dec. 3, 1992).
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dards rather than "morally and politically loaded words. '263 The proposal in this Article seeks to establish for securities lawyers some of the
certainty in professional conduct norms that the bar has aspired to more
generally. The proposal is also efficient in providing this certainty

through default rules rather than forcing lawyers and clients to contract
for the certainty they prefer.
VIII.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE
PROPOSAL

A.
1.

ADVANTAGES

For Lawyers

The NationalStudent Marketing court deemed it "unnecessary to determine the precise extent of [the lawyers'] obligations" 264 when clients mislead their shareholders. However, such a determination is necessary, and
without it lawyers can be left without clear guidance when faced with
conflicts between client loyalty265 and confidentiality 266 on the one hand
and responsibility to uphold the law on the other. 267 A clear answer to
the question of when and to whom a lawyer must disclose client fraud
would restore some much needed certainty to the practice of securities
law. Nevertheless, the courts and the SEC have so far failed to provide
such an answer. Under the proposal in this Article, lawyers will have the
benefit of clear rules that define their responsibilities when faced with
corporate fraud. Indeed the proposal would be even more useful, and
attractive to the practicing bar, if coupled with a statutory safe harbor
protecting lawyers who comply from both civil suits and SEC disciplinary
proceedings.
263. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 512 n.8. (1988). Thus, there has
been
[T]ransformation of the 'honor codes' at various venerable universities.
These codes were phrased in quite general terms at their inception in the
18th and 19th centuries because these schools contained homogeneous student bodies who shared a common conception of the type of conduct definitionally incorporated within the word 'honor.' If a person thought that
purchasing a term paper from a professional term paper service was consistent with being honorable, then that person simply did not know what
'honor' meant. As values have changed and as student bodies have become
less homogeneous, however, shared definitions of terms such as 'honor' have
broken down. Some people now do think that buying a term paper can be
honorable, and this breakdown in shared meaning has caused general references to 'honor' to be displaced in such codes by more detailed rules. There
may now be little shared agreement about what the precept 'be honorable'
requires, but there is considerable agreement about what the rule 'do not
purchase a term paper' requires.
Id.
264. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978).
265. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1995) ("A lawyer
should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.").
266. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6 (1996).
267. Id. pmbl. ("[A] lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law
."); id. ("Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society.").
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2. For Registrants
The proposal in this Article strengthens the working relationship between lawyers, officers, and boards of directors because everybody will
know what lawyers must disclose and to whom. Corporate officers will
know when a registrant's lawyers are required to turn to the full board of
directors. Directors in turn will know that lawyers are required to tell
them when management fails to remedy an illegal act. Unless the registrant opts out of disclosure to the board by amending its articles of incorporation, the problem that ruined National Telephone, the failure of
Carter and Johnson to inform the outside directors of securities laws violations for over a year,268 is unlikely to occur. Finally, the board will
know what lawyers are required to do if the board does not take action to
remedy an illegal act.
Game theory postulates that cooperation among players is fostered by
some degree of certainty about how each other will act. 269 The same is
true of lawyers and their clients. Officers and directors of organizational
clients are more likely to listen to, and follow the advice of, lawyers
whom they know must do something about client fraud. The opt-in and
opt-out mechanisms of the proposal allow clients some flexibility to specify ex ante exactly what it is that the lawyers must do.
3. For Investors
The proposal in this Article provides additional protection to investors
who rely on complete and accurate disclosure in buying securities. By
looking at a registrant's articles of incorporation, investors will know how
much lawyer "gatekeeping" they can expect. In addition, the proposal
removes ambiguity about how lawyers should respond to corporate fraud
and as a result may increase investors' confidence in the integrity of the
legal profession.
B.
1.

DISADVANTAGES

For Lawyers

This proposal may increase malpractice insurance premiums if insurers
anticipate lawsuits based on failure to carry out the new disclosure obligations. One way to reduce the cost of insurance would be for the disclosure provisions to specifically exclude a civil right of action for violation
thereof.2 70 Furthermore, insurers should recognize ways in which a re268. See Carter & Johnson, supra note 115.
269. "[Tlhe conditions for Nash equilibrium are that players are relatively certain how
their opponents will act." DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING
140 (1990); see Painter, supra note 39.
270. Section 203 of the 1995 Reform Act specifically states that "[niothing in this Act
... shall be deemed to create or ratify any implied private right of action," and an accountant thus presumably could not be sued for a violation of 1934 Act Section 10A alone. 1995
Reform Act, supra note 6, § 203 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-). A statutory requirement
that lawyers disclose client fraud should be subject to a similar limitation on private rights
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quirement to disclose client fraud diminishes total malpractice liability
exposure. If required disclosure cuts down on client fraud and makes
lawyers less likely to be caught up in whatever fraud does occur, insurance premiums actually should go down.271 A statutory safe harbor for
lawyers who comply would also reduce the cost of insurance.
Another perhaps more serious problem with the proposal is that the
rules may remain unclear. If lawyers and the SEC cannot reach a similar
understanding as to when information indicates "that an illegal act has
occurred," then lawyers may be no better off than they are under the
current regime. 272 The proposed language does not impose on lawyers a
due diligence duty to look for client fraud. However, some facts that a
lawyer may learn about her client lie in the grey area between information clearly indicating that a fraud has occurred and information that only
should put a reasonably diligent lawyer on notice that she should investigate further. Of course, the materiality standard that lies at the heart of
the securities laws, including the new Section 10A, also contains grey areas, and these grey areas do not make that standard inoperable. It remains to be seen how well the SEC and the accounting profession handle
grey areas in the accountant disclosure provisions of the 1995 Reform
Act. Perhaps their success in implementing that statute will indicate how
well similar language would work for lawyers.
2.

For Registrants

One result of the proposal is that corporate officers may be inclined not
to share vital information with their lawyers because they fear disclosure
to the board of directors or to the SEC. If clients fear disclosure because
of a lawyer disclosure requirement, this may impede other aspects of lawyers' work for their clients.273 The result would be a decrease in the overall quality of representation for clients as well as potential harm to
investors resulting from lawyers' lack of information they need to rectify
illegal conduct. For this reason, we propose that registrants be allowed to
insert opt-out provisions in their articles to redirect disclosure from the
full board of directors (the default rule) to a committee of the board, a
compliance officer, or another appropriate person. This is also the principal justification for making disclosure to the SEC an opt-in rule that will
be chosen only by those registrants who believe that they will benefit
more than they will be harmed by instructing their lawyers ex ante to
274
disclose.
of action. Compliance with the statutory requirement, however, should be available as a
defense to suits brought under existing private rights of action.

271. See Painter, supra note 39, at 291.

272. As Quinton Seamons asks about the accountant disclosure provisions in § 10A,
"What is the standard of evidence for auditors in determining illegal acts-for example,
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
reasonable evidence, etc." Seamons, supra note 189, at 8.
273. See generally Painter, supra note 39, at 286-91.
274. See Painter, supra note 39, at 275 (discussing the benefits to clients of ex ante commitments by lawyers to disclose illegal acts to regulators). See also U.S. SENTENCING COM-

1996]

LAWYERS DISCLOSING CORPORATE FRAUD

3. Political Disadvantages
Attorneys, unlike accountants, are primarily subject to the supervision
of state courts and bar disciplinary committees. The SEC has found that
mandating disclosure, or any standard of professional conduct, by lawyers
can be even more controversial from a political standpoint than similar
regulation of accountants. Attempts by the SEC or by federal legislation-such as that proposed in this Article-to regulate attorney conduct
raise federalism issues and issues surrounding the respective functions of
the legislature and the judiciary; these issues do not arise in the case of
accountants. Shouldn't individual states be allowed to determine appropriate standards for lawyer conduct without interference from the federal
and the SEC, be the
level? And shouldn't courts, rather than Congress
27 5
ultimate regulators of the legal profession?
These are legitimate questions, although it is also legitimate to ask why
lawyers should not, like all other participants in securities transactions, be
subject to federal as well as state regulation. On balance, it furthermore
appears that the patchwork of state ethics rules and bar opinions that
govern disclosure of client fraud is insufficient, unclear, and, worst of all
for issuers selling securities in multiple jurisdictions, inconsistent. As
Harris Weinstein, the former Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision, has pointed out:
If you are in Wilmington, Delaware, confronted by a client's intended fraudulent conduct that will likely cause substantial financial
harm, and you practice law also in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, you
are subject to three different rules. New Jersey requires disclosure to
disclosure. Pennsylvania
the proper authorities. Delaware forbids
276
permits but does not require disclosure.
8C2.5(f),(g) (five-point reduction
in culpability for self-reporting a particular offense).
275. In 1982, a federal policy making committee made up of both regulators and attorneys reviewed disciplinary proceedings against lawyers by federal agencies and found that
"any current problems arising from the discipline of attorneys by federal agencies are not
of such a magnitude or so widespread as to require legislative action or a Conference recommendation for the adoption of uniform federal standards." Lawrence G. Baxter, Reforming Legal Ethics in a Regulated Environment: An Introductory Overview, 8 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHIcs 181, 200 (1995) (citing Report of the Committee on Governmental
Processes of the Administrative Conference of the U.S., in II DISCIPLINE OF ATrORNEYS
PRACTICING BEFORE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 488 (1982)). Professor Baxter suggests that
"it would be hard to imagine that regulators could muster sufficient political support for so
great an invasion of what lawyers perceive as their most exclusive province," even though
the "gains in certainty" from federal standards might be in the interest of lawyers practicing in regulated areas. Id. at 201-02. Of course, political support from bar associations is
not a prerequisite for action by agencies or Congress, id at 202 n.80, and the safe harbor
provisions suggested in this Article might be a sufficient inducement for the securities bar
to support uniform federal standards of the type suggested herein.
276. Harris Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the Savings and Loan Crisis, 1993 U. ILL. L.
REv. 53, 64. See N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1996) (requiring
a lawyer to disclose information necessary to prevent a client "from committing a criminal,
illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another."); DEL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996) (following Model Rule
1.6); PENN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1) (1996). Although many
MISSION FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
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Furthermore, as discussed above, regulators' vision of lawyer professional obligations often conflicts with the bar's interpretation of ethics
rules adopted in the various states.2 77 The judiciary in turn has done little
to referee this dispute between regulators and bar associations or to artic278
ulate clear, workable, and enforceable standards for lawyer conduct.
IX. CONCLUSION
Courts have yet to clarify the lawyer's responsibilities regarding client
fraud. Also, the SEC's disciplinary and enforcement proceedings rely on
vague and sometimes inconsistent standards. Because courts and the
SEC have been ambiguous on what a lawyer is required to disclose about
a client's conduct and to whom, Congress should clearly articulate ex ante
what lawyers' responsibilities are rather than leave those responsibilities
up to determination by courts and the SEC ex post.
This Article has proposed enacting into the securities laws a clear set of
rules stating exactly what lawyers must do about client fraud. Although
the 1995 Reform Act's immutable disclosure rules are appropriate for
accountants, lawyers should not be required to disclose client confidences
to regulators. Lawyers should instead be governed by some immutable
rules, such as rules requiring a lawyer to resign if a client refuses to rectify
a material illegal act, and some default rules, such as rules requiring disclosure of illegal acts to the full board of directors. Lawyers who comply
with the rules should be immune from civil suits and SEC disciplinary
actions grounded in a theory that they failed to perform a duty to disclose. The statutory language proposed in this Article thus should give
lawyers clear guidance for their practice, the SEC clear standards for lawyer discipline, and clients some opportunity to choose the rules that are
best for them.

states follow Pennsylvania in making disclosure optional, Florida follows New Jersey in

requiring disclosure. See

FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 1.6(b)(1)

(1996).
277. See, e.g., supra note 222; see generally Painter, supra note 39, at 230-37.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 106-12; Koniak, supra note 3, at 1079-91.

